Who Will Blink First?

[sassa]

Who will blink first?

America's reasons for and against an early attack on Iraq grow ever more complex, writes Julian Borger

Wednesday December 11, 2002

The delivery of Baghdad's declaration on banned weapons represents a critical moment of truth for a US president who has apparently become more hesitant over the use of force as the prospect of war has drawn closer.

The 12,000-page report is going to take days to evaluate fully, but its general thrust was made clear by the Iraqi government on handing it over. Nothing in it contradicts Baghdad's assertion that it is neither developing nor stockpiling weapons of mass destruction.

It is an entirely predictable response, and one that the Bush administration must have anticipated as far back as September when it chose to take the United Nations route in its confrontation with Saddam Hussein.

Yet there was no consensus in the war cabinet last week on how to react. It took two meetings in three days to come to a tentative agreement - that the US should characterise the declaration as a breach of last month's UN resolution on Iraqi disarmament, but not for the time being - a cause for war.

Between the extremes of rejecting the need for inspections outright and allowing them to plod on without posing a serious challenge to the Iraqi regime, a middle course was chosen. The US would demand an immediate intensification of the search, with more inspectors (including Americans privy to US intelligence) and the aggressive pursuit of interviews with Iraqi officials in the biological, chemical, nuclear and missile sciences, accompanied by offers to help the interviewees and their families defect.

The hope is that such measures will either uncover a "smoking gun" - proof of Iraqi deception convincing enough draw significant foreign support for punitive action, or that together with a steady US military build-up, it will cause the regime to iaghdad's assertion that it is neither developing nor stockpiling weapons of mass destruction.

It is an entirely predictable response, and one that the Bush administration must have anticipated as far back as September when it chose to take the United Nations route in its confrontation with Saddam Hussein.

Yet there was no consensus in the war cabinet last week on how to react. It took two meetings in three days to come to a tentative agreement - that the US should characterise the declaration as a breach of last month's UN resolution on Iraqi disarmament, but not for the time being - a cause for war.

Between the extremes of rejecting the need for inspections outright and allowing them to plod on without posing a serious challenge to the Iraqi regime, a middle course was chosen. The US would demand an immediate intensification of the search, with more inspectors (including Americans privy to US intelligence) and the aggressive pursuit of interviews with Iraqi officials in the biological, chemical, nuclear and missile sciences, accompanied by offers to help the interviewees and their families defect.

The hope is that such measures will either uncover a "smoking gun" - proof of Iraqi deception convincing enough draw significant foreign support for punitive action, or that together with a steady US military build-up, it will cause the regime to implode.

However, most former inspectors believe that even such super-charged inspections are unlikely to produce such a convenient result. UN inspectors, they point out, are unqualified to carry out FBI-style interrogations and they have no witness protection programme to offer would-be defectors.

In which case, George Bush will only have succeeded in postponing the hard choice between peace and war that only presidents can make. Having begun the year in the embrace of the administration hawks, setting in motion preparations aimed at taking Baghdad within 12 months, he was convinced by the secretary of state, Colin Powell, to give diplomacy and inspections a final chance.

In his new book, Bush at War, the celebrated Washington journalist Bob Woodward gives an account of a pivotal White House meeting between Bush and Powell in early August, in which Powell explained why the US could not go it alone against Iraq. If nothing else, it needed bases from which to launch an assault, and even America's closest allies in the region were reluctant.

The president opted to take the UN course, despite the vigorous objections of his own vice-president, Dick Cheney, and the other hawks, incidentally demonstrating that in matters of national security, the commander-in-chief is not necessarily in anybody's pocket.

But part of the sales technique for UN inmplode.

However, most former inspectors believe that even such super-charged inspections are unlikely to produce such a convenient result. UN inspectors, they point out, are unqualified to carry out FBI-style interrogations and they have no witness protection programme to offer would-be defectors.

In which case, George Bush will only have succeeded in postponing the hard choice between peace and war that only presidents can make. Having begun the year in the embrace of the administration hawks, setting in motion preparations aimed at taking Baghdad within 12 months, he was convinced by the secretary of state, Colin Powell, to give diplomacy and inspections a final chance.

In his new book, Bush at War, the celebrated Washington journalist Bob Woodward gives an account of a pivotal White House meeting between Bush and Powell in early August, in which Powell explained why the US could not go it alone against Iraq. If nothing else, it needed bases from which to launch an assault, and even America's closest allies in the region were reluctant.

The president opted to take the UN course, despite the vigorous objections of his own vice-president, Dick Cheney, and the other hawks, incidentally demonstrating that in matters of national security, the commander-in-chief is not necessarily in anybody's pocket.

But part of the sales technique for UN inspections employed by Powell (and by Tony Blair) was that they would ultimately produce a casus belli. Sooner or later, they would unearth frightful weapons or they would force Saddam into a desperate act of obstruction.

The state department and the British are sticking to that line, calling for the inspections to be allowed to run their course, even if it takes months. The hawks argue just as vociferously that the inspections represent a dead end that allows Saddam to run out the clock, delaying military action until Iraq's desert heat offers another line of defence against an invading US army. American and British officials argue that the much-quoted March deadline for an assault is a chimera. US and British troops can fight in any terrain, they say, but then they are not the ones who will have to struggle through temperatures of over 37C (100F) in a plastic chemical-biological protection suit. From the point of view of the men in uniform, time is running out, but to go to war while the inspectors are hard at work would risk alienating the limited support the US had rallied on the world stage, as would a blatantly trumped-up casus belli.

The informed speculation in Washington is that Bush is genuinely undecided over what to do, in the face of forceful arguments on either side. This is how the equation looks.

In favour of going to war soon:

spections employed by Powell (and by Tony Blair) was that they would ultimately produce a casus belli. Sooner or later, they would unearth frightful weapons or they would force Saddam into a desperate act of obstruction.

The state department and the British are sticking to that line, calling for the inspections to be allowed to run their course, even if it takes months. The hawks argue just as vociferously that the inspections represent a dead end that allows Saddam to run out the clock, delaying military action until Iraq's desert heat offers another line of defence against an invading US army. American and British officials argue that the much-quoted March deadline for an assault is a chimera. US and British troops can fight in any terrain, they say, but then they are not the ones who will have to struggle through temperatures of over 37C (100F) in a plastic chemical-biological protection suit. From the point of view of the men in uniform, time is running out, but to go to war while the inspectors are hard at work would risk alienating the limited support the US had rallied on the world stage, as would a blatantly trumped-up casus belli.

The informed speculation in Washington is that Bush is genuinely undecided over what to do, in the face of forceful arguments on either side. This is how the equation looks.

In favour of going to war soon:

· The longer the inspections continue without result, the weaker the US case will look. The declaration may be the best piece of evidence of Iraqi bad faith that Washington can use.

· The US cannot afford to maintain the current state of enhanced military readiness without going to war or standing down, and the latter would look like failure

· Prevarication would look Clintonian to Bush's core supporters on the right and sow discord in the party.

· Waiting gives Iraq more time to prepare its defences

In favour of waiting:

· It will keep the precarious war coalition together

· It would avoid charges of violating international law which could come back to haunt the administration

· It could make better sense politically. The fate of Bush's father demonstrated that it does not pay to win a war too long before an election. The glow of victory pales fast.

For the time being, the administration has taken the Micawber approach, hoping for something to turn up. And to increase the chances of just such a stroke of good fortune, it has lit a fire under Hans Blix, and Mohammed el-Baradei, the chief UN inspectors, telling them to be more aggressive.

This strategy may help split differences within the Bush national security team, but it is likely to be damaging for the health of the UN. Filling the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspec· The longer the inspections continue without result, the weaker the US case will look. The declaration may be the best piece of evidence of Iraqi bad faith that Washington can use.

· The US cannot afford to maintain the current state of enhanced military readiness without going to war or standing down, and the latter would look like failure

· Prevarication would look Clintonian to Bush's core supporters on the right and sow discord in the party.

· Waiting gives Iraq more time to prepare its defences

In favour of waiting:

· It will keep the precarious war coalition together

· It would avoid charges of violating international law which could come back to haunt the administration

· It could make better sense politically. The fate of Bush's father demonstrated that it does not pay to win a war too long before an election. The glow of victory pales fast.

For the time being, the administration has taken the Micawber approach, hoping for something to turn up. And to increase the chances of just such a stroke of good fortune, it has lit a fire under Hans Blix, and Mohammed el-Baradei, the chief UN inspectors, telling them to be more aggressive.

This strategy may help split differences within the Bush national security team, but it is likely to be damaging for the health of the UN. Filling the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic) with American inspectors brimming with US intelligence will seriously undermine its credibility and independence. Unmovic, meanwhile, does not have the means, expertise or inclination to solicit defections by Iraqi scientists. UN resolution 1441 allows for officials and their families to be questioned outside Iraq, but it is still unclear how this could be done. How big is a family, for example? Even if a would-be defector's spouse and children were guaranteed safety, what about his or her elderly parents and cousins in the villages? Would anyone who has witnessed the brutality of Saddam Hussein's security apparatus trust a bunch of UN amateurs who would be reluctantly experimenting with a witness protection scheme for the first time?

The intention behind the beefed-up inspections programmes, in the words of one US administration official are to "stress the system". The system he had in mind was the Iraqi government. But the other target of this stress, intentionally or not, is the United Nations itself and the process of international consultation it represents. That may break before Iraq does.