9/11 Commission: U.S. Terror War has Stymied al Qaida

[obby]

Tuesday, June 29, 2004 11:52 a.m. EDT

9/11 Commission: U.S. Terror War has Stymied al Qaida

The Sept. 11 Commission has found that the Bush administration's war on terror has severely impaired al Qaida's ability to organize another spectacular attack against the U.S. homeland by capturing or killing the deadly terror group's key leaders, drying up their financial resources and severely limiting their ability to "strategize, plan attacks, and dispatch operatives worldwide."

The bombshell finding, buried at the end of the Commission's Staff Statement No. 15, should have been hailed in the press as evidence that we've at least turned the corner in the war on terror - and may indeed have the enemy on the run. Instead, reporters have ignored this particular Commission finding since its release on June 16.

Here's the part of Staff Statement 15 that the press decided Americans didn't need to hear about, as reported by the Commission under the heading "Al Qaeda* Today."

"Since the September 11 attacks and the defeat of the Taliban, as Qaeda's funding has decreased significantly. The arrests or deaths of several important financial facilitators have decreased the amount of money al Qaeda has raised and increased the costs and difficulty of raising and moving that money.

"Some entirely corrupt charities are now out of business, with many of their principals killed or captured, although some charities may still be providing support to al Qaeda.

"Moreover, it appears that the al Qaeda attacks within Saudi Arabia in May and November 2003 have reduced - perhaps drastically - at Qaeda's ability to raise funds from Saudi sources. Both an increase in Saudi enforcement and a more negative perception of al Qaeda by potential donors have cut its income." [END OF EXCERPT]

And the good news for America - not to mention the Bush administration - doesn't end there. In the same section, Staff Statement 15 notes:

"Prior to 9/11, al Qaeda was a centralized organization which used Afghanistan as a war room to strategize, plan attacks, and dispatch operatives worldwide." But now, says the Commission, "Bin Ladin's* seclusion [has] forced operational commanders and cell leaders to assume greater authority; they are now making the command decisions previously made by him." [END OF EXCERPT]

In other words, whether dead or alive, the prime mover behind the Sept. 11 attacks has been taken out of commission, with operational authority handed over to allies of convenience like Abu Musab al Zarqawi.

And while Zarqawi has mounted dozens of operations throughout the Middle East in recent months, including a deadly chem-bomb plot foiled by Jordanian authorities in April, his focus these days seems to be pretty much on Iraq - not America.

And even there, Zarqawi seems to be feeling the heat lately. According to the recent communique he sent to bin Laden, published on Islamic web sites earlier this month, he complained about being "squeezed" by U.S. forces.

"The space of movement is starting to get smaller," he told the 9/11 chief. "The [u.S.] grip is starting to be tightened on the holy warriors' necks and, with the spread of soldiers and police, the future [for our side] is becoming frightening."

To be sure, the 9/11 Commission did not attribute any success in the terror war to the president by name, though as its leader and chief strategist, that conclusion is inescapable.

And neither does Staff Statement 15 say that al Qaeda has been completely vanquished, warning instead that the bin Laden network is still able to execute smaller operations and is "striving to attack the U.S. and inflict mass casualties" - using nuclear weapons if possible.

Still, when the 9/11 Commission reports: "Al Qaeda today is more a loose collection of regional networks with a greatly weakened central organization," it's hard not to conclude President Bush's war on terror is making significant progress.

Unless you're a journalist.

http://newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/6/29/121539.shtml

Monday, June 21, 2004 1:25 p.m. EDT

Media in Denial Over 9/11 Commish Lehman's Revelation

Once again, the press is being disingenuous when it comes to information disseminated by the 9/11 Commission, this time in its coverage of a 9/11 commissioner's revelation yesterday that a top al-Qaida operative was also a high-ranking member of Saddam Hussein's most elite military unit.

"There's new intelligence, and this has come since our staff report has been written," former Navy Secretary John Lehman announced Sunday on "Meet the Press."

He explained that documents uncovered in Baghdad "indicate that there is at least one officer of Saddam's Fedayeen, a lieutenant colonel, who was a very prominent member of al-Qaida."

Actually, the only thing new about this intelligence is that the 9/11 Commission, along with the mainstream press, is finally paying attention to it. In fact, as "Meet the Press" moderator Tim Russert certainly had to know, the Wall Street Journal reported on these very same documents three weeks ago.

"One striking bit of new evidence is that the name Ahmed Hikmat Shakir appears on three captured rosters of officers in Saddam Fedayeen, the elite paramilitary group run by Saddam's son Uday and entrusted with doing much of the regime's dirty work," reported the Journal on May 27. "Our government sources, who have seen translations of the documents, say Shakir is listed with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel."

Another bit of deviousness by the press is the way reporters are covering Lehman's not-so-new revelation. The New York Daily News, for instance, headlined its report "Iraq-al Qaeda Link Teases 9/11 Panel."

But this particular Iraqi officer's membership in al-Qaida does much, much more than establish a link between Iraq and al-Qaida. As the same Journal report noted:

"This matters because if Shakir was an officer in the Fedayeen, it would establish a direct link between Iraq and the al Qaeda operatives who planned 9/11. Shakir was present at the January 2000 al Qaeda 'summit' in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at which the 9/11 attacks were planned."

That's right. After months and months of media assurances that there was no link between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks, the 9/11 Commission is now reviewing evidence that strongly suggests otherwise.

To be fair to the press, even Lehman seemed not to appreciate the significance of his announcement, telling "Meet the Press" he still had no evidence of an Iraq-9/11 link.

Then there are those Commission members, such as Richard Ben Veniste, who won't accept an Iraq-9/11 link unless videotape emerges of Saddam at the controls of one of the hijacked planes.

"Take it to the bank, there was no Iraqi involvement in 9/11," Ben Veniste announced haughtily while sitting next to Lehman on the same broadcast. "Let's put that to bed. That's what our commission found. ... We looked at everything available. No connection between Iraq and the 9/11 catastrophe."

Don't look now, Mr. Ben Veniste, but some relevant evidence pointing to Saddam's involvement in 9/11 just became "available."

http://newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/6/21/132701.shtml

Friday, June 18, 2004 9:21 a.m. EDT

9/11 Chair Hamilton Slams Media Distortions

Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission Lee Hamilton blasted the mainstream press yesterday for distorting the Commission's findings on links between Iraq and al-Qaida, saying those findings actually support Bush administration contentions.

"The sharp differences that the press has drawn [between the White House and the Commission] are not that apparent to me," Hamilton told the Associated Press, a day after insisting that his probe uncovered "all kinds" of connections between Osama bin Laden's terror network and Iraq.

Hamilton's comments followed a deluge of mainstream reports falsely claiming that the 9/11 Commission had discredited the Bush administration's claim of longstanding links between Baghdad and bin Laden.

But the Indiana Democrat said the press accounts were flat-out wrong.

"There are all kinds of ties," he told PBS's "The News Hour" late Wednesday, in comments that establishment journalists have refused to report.

"There are all kinds of connections. And it may very well have been that Osama bin Laden or some of his lieutenants met at some time with Saddam Hussein's lieutenants."

Hamilton said that while his probe had failed to uncover any direct operational link between Baghdad and Osama bin Laden's terror network in attacks on the U.S., there's no question that "they had contacts."

http://newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/6/18/92642.shtml

Wednesday, June 16, 2004 1:13 p.m. EDT

Media Mislead on 9/11 Commission Finding on Iraq-al Qaida Link

Reports Wednesday morning that the 9/11 Commission has determined there was no cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaida are completely false - and are undoubtedly driven by the media's determination to contradict the Bush administration's claims that such a link exists.

"9/11 Panel Says Iraq Rebuffed Bin Laden" reads the headline on the Associated Press report on today's Commission staff statement.

But that's not what the Commission staff report actually said.

The below passage, for instance, does more to confirm the Bush administration's claims of an Iraq-al Qaida link than it does to contradict them.

"The Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded Bin Ladin* to cease [support for anti-Saddam Islamists in Northern Iraq] and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda*.

"A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting Bin Ladin in 1994. Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded." [staff Statement No. 15, Page 5]

Apparently never responded? How, pray tell, does the AP derive from those words the conclusive claim that Iraq "rebuffed" bin Laden?

The Commission statement continues:

"There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after Bin Ladin had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship."

What's the evidence for this less-than-conclusive surmise?

"Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq," says the Commission.

Such a statement begs the question: Why does the Commission, let alone the press, take the word of two senior bin Laden associates over, say, Iraq's new prime minister, Iyad Allawi.

Last December he told the London Telegraph, "We are uncovering evidence all the time of Saddam's involvement with al-Qaeda."

Reacting to the discovery of an Iraqi intelligence document placing 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta in Baghdad two months before the attacks, he continued:

"This is the most compelling piece of evidence that we have found so far. It shows that not only did Saddam have contacts with al-Qaeda, he had contact with those responsible for the September 11 attacks."

In fact, nowhere does the Commission make the claim that Iraq and al-Qaida never cooperated. What it does say is "We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States." [NewsMax italics]

Apparently Dr. Allawi's asssement counts for nothing.

Even so, it's worth noting that elsewhere in today's staff statement, the 9/11 Commission asserts:

"With al Qaeda at its foundation, Bin Ladin sought to build a broader Islamic Army that included terrorist groups from Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Oman, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea. Not all [terrorist] groups from these states agreed to join, but at least one from each did." [staff Statement No. 15, Page 3]

In other words, at least one terror group from Iraq did form an alliance with bin Laden.

Another problem: If the press is going to take today's staff statement as gospel, certain long-held media assumptions will need to be drastically revised, such as the widely accepted notion that al-Qaida was involved in the first World Trade Center bombing.

Not true, says the Commission.

"Whether Bin Ladin and his organization had roles in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center ... remains a matter of substantial uncertainty," the staff statement says, before insisting, "We have no conclusive evidence" of a bin Laden link. [staff Statement No. 15, Page 6]

The same goes for "Operation Bojinka," the 1995 plot to hijack 12 airliners hatched by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed that experts say was the blueprint for the 9/11 attacks.

"[Mohammed] was not, however, an al Qaeda member at the time of the Manilla [bojinka] plot," Commission staffers say, even though they acknowledge that he went on to mastermind the 9/11 attacks.

The press is furiously spinning the 9/11 Commission staff statement in a bid to discredit the Bush administration. Americans should go to the Sept. 11 Commission Web site and read the conclusions for themselves: http://www.9-11commission.gov/

http://newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/6/16/132355.shtml

Knight Ridder Gets It Wrong

The news service giant puts words in the president's mouth and then looks the other way on connections between Iraq and al Qaeda.

by Stephen F. Hayes

07/14/2004 10:30:00 AM

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President Bush continued to insist Monday that there was an operational link between former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida despite reports by the Senate Intelligence Committee and the commission that's investigating the Sept. 11 attacks that there was no evidence that Saddam and Islamic terrorists collaborated to kill Americans.

(Jonathan Landay and William Douglas, Knight Ridder Newspapers, July 12, 2004) [Emphasis added]

THAT SENTENCE IS FALSE. It was the lead passage in a story about President Bush's speech Monday at the Oak Ridge National Laboratories in Tennessee. Bush did not claim an "operational link" between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. He could not have "continued to insist" on such an "operational link" because he has never done so before. And, finally, neither the September 11 Commission nor the Senate Intelligence Committee reported that there was "no evidence that Saddam and Islamic terrorists collaborated to kill Americans."

Other than that, the sentence was accurate. The complete text of Bush's speech is here.

By Wednesday, Knight Ridder had posted a correction. "President Bush's comments about terrorism were incorrectly reported in that saying the president insisted there was an operational link between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. The president suggested that such a link existed, but didn't explicitly make that connection."

The correction is incorrect. The president never even "suggested that such a link"--the referent is an "operational link"--existed.

The sentence was hardly the only problem with the story, which ran under the headline "Bush Again Tries to Link Saddam, al Qaeda." Knight Ridder is the second

largest newspaper chain in the United States. Its stories run in major metropolitan daily newspapers such as the Miami Herald, the Charlotte Observer and the Philadelphia Inquirer. According to a company press release from May 5, 2004, Knight Ridder "publishes 31 daily newspapers in 28 U.S. markets, with a readership of 8.7 million daily and 12.6 million Sunday."

The authors continue:

In its report, the Senate Intelligence Committee affirmed CIA analyses that found that while there had been contacts between al-Qaida and Iraqi intelligence officials during the 1990s, "these contacts did not add up to an established relationship."

Again, not true. The report is misquoted. According to Conclusion 93 of the Senate Intelligence Committee report the "contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship." [emphasis added] How many terrorist groups have "established formal relationships" with their state sponsors? State sponsors often--but not always--prefer to keep their terrorist connections loose and informal so that they might avoid detection, deniability being a major goal of states that use terrorists to do their dirty work.

The Senate Intelligence Committee language is important for another reason: Documents from the Iraqi Intelligence service do suggest an "established relationship," just not "an established formal relationship." A report in the June 25, 2004, New York Times, was based on an internal Iraqi Intelligence document: When bin Laden left the Sudan in 1996, according to the Iraqi Intelligence document, Iraqi Intelligence began "seeking other channels through which to handle the relationship, in light of [bin Laden's] current location." The report also indicates that bin Laden "had some reservations about being labeled an Iraqi operative" and that "cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop freely through discussion and agreement."

The Iraqis themselves, then, talked about the connection with al Qaeda in terms of the "relationship" and "cooperation." At the same time, bin Laden was reluctant to formalize the relationship.

Does the lack of an "established formal relationship" preclude cooperation? Not according to bin Laden. The same internal Iraqi Intelligence document reports that bin Laden "requested joint operations against foreign forces" based in Saudi Arabia.

THE KNIGHT RIDDER STORY also questions Bush administration claims on Abu Musab al Zarqawi. But rather than refer to the report prepared by the Senate Intelligence Committee to discuss Zarqawi's activities, the authors turn to anonymous "U.S. intelligence officials":

U.S. intelligence officials consider Zarqawi an associate of the terrorist network, not a member sworn to obey Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi, they think, is an independent operator who has an agenda similar to bin Laden's and cooperates with al Qaeda when it's convenient. He and some followers found sanctuary in an enclave in northern Iraq run by armed Kurdish Islamic extremists that was outside Saddam's control.

In 2002, Zarqawi reportedly received medical treatment in Baghdad and set up cells in the city, leading Bush administration officials to view his presence there are proof that Saddam was collaborating with al Qaeda.

U.S. Intelligence officials think it just as likely that Iraqi officials, who were hostile to Islamic extremists, gave him medical care and refuge because it was easier to monitor his activities in Baghdad than in northern Iraq.

There are no doubt U.S. intelligence officials who have provided this assessment. Their views, however,

were not included in the Senate Intelligence Committee's report. That report quotes a finished CIA report from January 2003 called Iraqi Support for Terrorism on the question of Zarqawi:

A variety of reporting indicates that senior al Qaeda terrorist planner al Zarqawi was in Baghdad [redacted]. A foreign government service asserted that the IIS [iraqi Intelligence Service] knew where al Zarqawi was located despite Baghdad's claims that it could not find him.

The CIA calls Zarqawi a "senior al Qaeda terrorist planner" and adds the detail that the Iraqi regime claimed it could not find him. The Senate report concludes:

Al Zarqawi and his network were operating both in Baghdad and in the Kurdish-controlled region of Iraq. The HUMINT reporting indicated that the Iraqi regime certainly knew that al Zarqawi was in Baghdad because a foreign government service gave that information to Iraq.[emphasis added]

So the Senate Intelligence Committee report, based on CIA findings, concludes not only that the Iraqi regime "certainly" knew of Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad, but also that Zarqawi and his network were "operating" in the Iraqi capital and in northern Iraq.These facts were left out of the Knight Ridder story, too.

There is much we all have to learn about Iraq's relationship with al Qaeda. As the Senate report makes clear, what knowledge we currently possess is based on inadequate intelligence collection from the U.S. intelligence community. What we are learning now--whether from detainees or captured Iraqi documents--reinforces one central fact: Iraq and al Qaeda had a relationship.

And as the CIA's Counterterrorism Center--and this, too, was included in the Senate Intelligence Committee report--said in describing its aggressive analysis of the Iraq-al Qaeda connection: "Any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States."

Any indication. That wasn't in the Knight Ridder story, either.