Reality Check in Iraq

[sobeton]

Violence surges even as conditions improve

18 months after war's end, reality check in Iraq

By Richard Engel

Correspondent

NBC News

Updated: 7:58 p.m. ET Sept. 23, 2004

BAGHDAD, Iraq - Iraqis watching Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's speech on a television at a Baghdad cafe were skeptical.

"In Samarra, the Iraqi government has tackled the insurgents who once controlled the city," Allawi told members of the U.S. Congress.

"What he's saying isn't true. I can't even name an Iraqi city where there aren't clashes," said one Iraqi citizen.

Thursday, there were more clashes between U.S. troops and insurgents in Samarra and Sadr City — two of the eight strongholds guerrillas control. The others? Fallujah, Ramadi, Baqubah, Tall Afar, Mahmudiya and Beiji.

"What we have now, ironically, is a situation where Iraq is now more of a terror state safe haven today, than it was when Saddam was in power," says terrorism expert and NBC News analyst Roger Cressey.

It seems to be getting worse. In September alone, there were 990 attacks on American troops — up 100 percent since last January. But increasingly, Iraqis themselves are targeted — 706 police have been killed in the past 18 months along with between 3,000-6,000 civilians. The instability forced the U.S. to divert $3 billion from reconstruction to security.

So where does the reconstruction stand?

• Electricity: There is more than under Saddam but demand is up 80 percent, so it's still rationed — four hours on, two hours off.

• Water: U.S. officials say there's no clean drinking water in all of Iraq because of sewage contamination.

• Oil: The biggest problem is sabotage, keeping overall production short of the three million target, at 2.6 million barrels a day.

• Jobs: A major improvement — one year ago, 60 percent of Iraqis were unemployed. Today, it's almost half that — 30-40 percent.

Iraqis no longer live under the oppressive scrutiny of Saddam's government. The giant busts that once adorned Saddam's palaces have been torn down like his regime — giving Iraqis something unquantifiable — their freedom.

Another freedom — the press. There are now about 200 independent newspapers; under Saddam there wasn't a single one.

"Iraqis are glad for their freedom, their personal and political freedom, and they're trying to make good use of both," says Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution.

Nothing symbolizes freedom as much as an election, and with voting scheduled for January, many wonder: will the insurgents allow Iraqis to exercise their most basic of freedoms?

© 2004 MSNBC Interactive

[igloo]

September 24, 2004, 8:28 a.m.

Coming Unhinged?

Public opinion in Iraq.

James S. Robbins

During Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi's Rose Garden appearance Thursday, President Bush referred to public-opinion polls in Iraq to make a point about how things are going. "I saw a poll that said the right track/wrong track in Iraq was better than here in America," he said, prompting Kerry spokesman Joe Lockhart to claim that the president had become "unhinged from reality." I found Lockhart's comment odd. It strikes me that polling data are a better reflection of conditions on the ground in Iraq than, say, Democratic talking points. Lately I have been looking over the results of two Iraq polls released in July and August, conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Independent Institute for Administrative and Civil Society Studies (IIACCS). They are scientifically conducted polls with large sample sizes and low margins of error. The results are extremely detailed, and fascinating reading.

The datum for which the president courted Lockhart's ire was the response to the question, "Do you feel that Iraq is generally heading in the right direction or the wrong direction?" In July, 51 percent said right direction, 31 percent said wrong direction. An Annenburg survey from that same period in the United States did in fact show almost the opposite result (37 percent right track, 55 percent wrong track), as the president rightly observed. Thus, contrary to Lockhart's assertion, the president was well grounded in reality, very strongly hinged. Incidentally, of those who said Iraq is on the wrong track, only 5 percent said it is because of unemployment, which tends to undercut John Kerry's model of an insurgency being fuelled by the angry unemployed. He stated Monday that unemployment in Iraq is over 50 percent, and Al Jazeera reported in August that the rate was 70 percent. But polling over the summer showed unemployment typically in the teens. The nationwide figures were 14.1 percent in June, 13.8 percent in July, and just under 12 percent in August. There are of course regional variations; for example unemployment in the southern city of Umara was 35 percent in June (dropping to 25 percent in July) — but in Baghdad the unemployment rate was below the national average (12 percent in June and 9 percent in July). In Najaf the July rate was under 9 percent. Rates that high are nothing to crow about by our standards, but they make more sense than Kerry's inflated figures. Also worthy of note is the finding that average household monthly income increased 72 percent from October 2003 to June 2004, according to surveys conducted by Oxford Research International.

Levels of satisfaction in Iraq varied by region. Among the Kurds, 85 percent think life has improved since the fall of Saddam. In the Mid-Euphrates region and the south, 52 percent are more satisfied. In Baghdad there was a three-way split between better, worse, and don't know. And in the Sunni Triangle only 12 percent think things have gotten better, understandable given both the fact that they had enjoyed special privileges under Saddam, and those who are now denied those privileges are making life difficult for everybody. Naturally, the security situation is on people's minds. Around 70 percent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statements, "Life today is full of uncertainty" and "I am afraid for myself and my family." However, there were similar high scores agreeing to the statement "I am hopeful for the future," and the highest scoring statement of all was "I think things will slowly get better." Responses to these questions showed the same regional dynamics, with the Kurds being the most hopeful, but even in the Sunni areas a plurality (42.5 percent) believed things would get better, against only 29.2 percent thinking they would get worse. When Iraqis were asked what issues concerned them the most, crime ranked as the number one initial response, at 39 percent. The insurgency ranked fifth at only 6 percent. This focus on reducing crime ties in to a general result I noted citing polls in my last NRO piece, that the Iraqi police are the most respected group in the country. There is broad approval (in the 60-percent range across the board) for the government, judges, the police, the army, and national guard. Sixty-two percent rated the interim government as either very or somewhat effective, and sixty-six percent placed Prime Minister Allawi in the same category.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was quoted Thursday saying that if parts of Iraq are still too violent to hold elections, they should go forward anyway. The polls reveal why keeping to the timetable is so important. It is a matter of maintaining the legitimacy of the process. Seventy-eight percent rate fair elections as their most important political right, and eighty-seven percent plan to vote in the elections in January, a far greater participation rate than we can expect in this country. Three quarters view increased violence as either very or somewhat likely in the period leading up to the election, and a similar percentage sees that as an acceptable reason for a delay; but almost two-thirds would have a negative view of the elections if they were delayed for one month. Even if the U.N. said the elections were not fair, 53.6 percent see that as an unacceptable reason to delay voting. Most people believe that no current Iraqi political party represents their views, and most also believe that political parties are dividers not uniters. Forty-five percent would be less inclined to vote for a party that maintains its own militia, not surprising given the misbehavior of the Baath party. In the Metro/Retro race, 64 percent would prefer a traditional candidate, against 18 percent preferring one with more modern values.

The place of religion in Iraqi politics is mixed. About 12.5 percent gave as a first response that Iraq should "defend Islamic values." Yet 70 percent believed that "Islam and the Sharia" should be "the sole basis for all laws and legislation." Thirty percent (the highest total for any one category) thought religious figures would make the best candidates for elections, followed by university professors at about 24 percent. Seventy-eight percent rate religious leaders as somewhat or completely trustworthy, coming in a close second behind academics. (Can you imagine a government of professors? I go to faculty meetings, believe me, philosopher kings are in short supply.) Most Iraqis say they would prefer that all religious sects practice their faith freely. But separation of church and state was attractive only to a quarter of those surveyed.

Some good news for fans of big government: When asked the best way to alleviate unemployment, a whopping 45 percent responded, "Start large public works programs." Creating jobs by encouraging investment came in last at under 6. Capitalism clearly takes some getting used to. Free health care was rated as the number one economic right by a small plurality (21 percent). Fifty-seven percent want to see a strong central government in Baghdad, rather than some form of federalism. Seventy-four percent believe that government, rather than individuals, are responsible for people's wellbeing. The statement "It is the role of the State to create wealth for the people" attracted 69 percent support, and "Wealth must be fairly and equally divided among the public by the State" was viewed favorably by 85 percent. On the other hand, 69 percent approved of the statement, "It is the responsibility of the individual to create wealth and the State must protect that right," and 60 percent agreed that "A person must earn their way in this world." So maybe the Lockean worldview has a chance after all. Finally, 57 percent either somewhat or completely trust the media, versus 36 percent who do not, almost the opposite of conditions in this country. Few Iraqis watch 60 Minutes however.

There are other polls of Iraqi opinion showing pretty much the same results. I have not gone into all the findings, mainly for lack of space. Anyway, I encourage people to read the reports themselves. The point is that if we are going to have a public discussion of how the war is going or whether we should be optimistic about the future of Iraq (and I think we should be), our views should be based on something more substantial than off-the-cuff remarks by political spokesmen. It is understandable that news coverage will focus on violence, and administration critics will spin events as negatively as possible. But if solid majorities of Iraqis believe conditions are improving, I think we should take them at their word. They have a better grip on their own reality than we do.

[mursa]

cmon now ....we aren't dealing with REALITY .... it's all about the rosey ideology !

[sobeton]

Wednesday, Sep. 15, 2004

Why Iraq's Not Getting Better

Despite optimism on the U.S. campaign trail, the choices in Baghdad are looking grim

By TONY KARON 2004 Time Inc

Every day in Iraq seems to bring a new horror. On Tuesday, for example, it was 47 killed by a car bomb in Baghdad, 11 slain by another in Baquba, 8 dead in a clash between U.S. troops and insurgents in Ramadi — and those were just the major incidents. U.S. casualties have risen every month since the June hand-over of political authority to the interim government of prime minister Iyad Allawi, and the pattern of confrontation is not encouraging. In April, the U.S. military fought insurgents in Fallujah, then battled Moqtada Sadr's men in Najaf in June. The U.S. returned there in August for a second, inconclusive battle and then, in September, found itself once again bombing Fallujah in preparation for another frontal assault. The Sadrists have also created flashpoints in Basra, Nasiriya, Karbala, Samawa, Kut and elsewhere throughout the Shiite south, while the Sunni insurgents have added Ramadi, Samarra, Baquba and others to the list of no-go areas for U.S. troops. And both Sunnis and Shiites continue to wreak havoc on the streets of Baghdad on a daily basis.

U.S. officials now concede that the insurgency is far larger than they first imagined, and it is growing both in numbers of fighters and also in the range and boldness of their attacks. And they acknowledge that whole towns in Sunni heartland, such as Fallujah, Samarra, Ramadi and Baqubah have been turned by insurgents into no-go areas for coalition forces. One measure of the depth of the security crisis in Iraq is the Bush administration's plan to spend money earmarked for reconstruction instead on urgent security priorities.

The security realities of Iraq don't help the Bush reelection campaign's efforts to paint Iraq as a success story for the project of exporting democracy to the Middle East. Indeed, even the U.S. intelligence community is reportedly offering the president a gloomy assessment of Iraq's prospects. But the electorate's attention may be elsewhere, and the administration appears to have persuaded many Americans that if these bombs weren't going off in Baghdad and Basra, they'd be going off in Boston and Biloxi.

Training Day

Still, to counter the impression created by the casualty count that Iraq is spinning out of control, U.S. officials are no longer simply whistling a happy tune. Yes Iraq is out of control, officials on the ground admit, and it could remain that way for some time yet. But, they add, help is on the way: Once sufficient numbers of Iraqi security personnel are trained and deployed — sometime next year — the burden borne by 130,000 U.S. troops will begin to ease. As silver linings go, it's a tempting explanation, both because it admits the current problems are in large part a result of U.S. failures — to devote sufficient resources to training the Iraqis; to recognize that dissolving Saddam's security forces would leave a security vacuum; even perhaps to heed the prewar advice of then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki that stabilizing Iraq would require in the region of 300,000 troops — at the same time as offering a rationale for "staying the course."

There are, however, considerable grounds for skepticism over the extent to which the training of Iraqi forces can transform the situation. Military training involves imparting combat skills and organizational discipline to create efficient fighting units with high levels of morale and confidence. By measure of basic combat skills and organization, the Iraqi security forces may already be substantially superior to Moqtada Sadr's rag-tag Mehdi army, which is composed largely of unemployed young toughs from the Shiite urban ghettoes. The difference between them on the battlefield, however, is based on morale and confidence — in other words, on motivation. The Sadrists are motivated by a strong nationalist sentiment and emboldened by a religious faith both in the righteousness of their cause and the celestial rewards of their "martyrdom." So too are the Sunni insurgents. And thus far, efforts to deploy Iraqi units in the frontline of pitched battles at both Fallujah and Najaf have proven largely ineffective — not because they lack the training to do battle, but because in many instances they lack the motivation to fight under U.S. command against fellow Iraqis. The rate of desertion among Iraqi forces is high, as is the rate of infiltration of these units by insurgents.

The fundamental challenge in transferring security responsibility to Iraqi forces is political. The U.S. must convince Iraqi personnel that they're fighting for Iraq, rather than fighting under the command of an unpopular foreign army. While the administration may have convinced its domestic audience that by transferring political authority to Allawi they have essentially handed the Iraqis back their country, they have yet to persuade many Iraqis of the same idea. Allawi is a U.S. appointee, and his power is based almost entirely on the backing of the U.S. military — a tough assignment in a country where even opinion polls commissioned by U.S. authority have found that a majority wants American forces to leave.

The answer to the political question, U.S. officials hope, will be the elections slated for January, since, if the Iraqis get to choose their own government, they'll have a stake in defending it. That's sound logic, although there are strong indicators that if the Iraqis get to choose their own government it may not look much like the one the U.S. is currently dealing with, and according to current indications of the platforms of a variety of Iraqi politicians may even be committed to asking the U.S. to leave.

Poll Positions

The more immediate problem, is that the current levels of violence make the prospect of a credible election being held four months from now increasingly remote. While U.S. and Iraqi officials continue to insist that the elections will go ahead on schedule, they acknowledge the difficulty presented by the fact that some of the major urban centers of the Sunni heartland are in insurgent hands. Prime Minister Allawi's proposal that a poll could be held without voting in those areas where violence precludes it could essentially break up the country. Already the Kurdish northeast is showing every intention of cutting ties to an increasingly chaotic center, and allowing an election without the participation of much of the Sunni heartland could presage further Balkanization.

More plausible, perhaps, is the suggestion on Wednesday by acting president Ghazi al-Yawer that the poll would go ahead unless the United Nations suggested it be canceled — and UN secretary general Kofi Annan on Wednesday said bluntly that credible elections could not be held on the basis of current conditions.

To make Iraq safe for voting, the U.S. and its Iraqi allies would have to launch frontal assaults to retake the "no-go" areas of the Sunni triangle. U.S. commanders are already saying it was a tactical mistake to have left the insurgents in control of towns that have become sanctuaries. But the reason for doing so in each instance was that U.S. military actions had the effect of turning more of the civilian population against the American presence — and, by extension, weakening the legitimacy of the government it installed. It's worth remembering that each time U.S. forces pulled back from the confrontations in Najaf and Fallujah, they were being implored to do so by many of the Iraqi politicians they'd put in power.

Getting the Sadrists on board is a second major challenge ahead of elections. Their capacity to disrupt order in Baghdad and throughout the Shiite south is by now well-established, although as a popular Shiite movement they have a lot more to gain from participating in elections than do the Sunni insurgents. (Shiites make up more than 60 percent of the population, whereas Sunni Arabs comprise less than 20 percent.) Sadr's game is not necessarily to prevent elections, but to ensure that, at some point, his party wins the lion's share of the Shiite vote.

To the extent that there is a Shiite political consensus, it is personified in the demand by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani that Iraq's transition be managed by a democratically elected government, and that such a government be elected forthwith. Sistani had previously threatened massive street demonstrations to ensure that such a poll be held immediately, and it took UN intervention to coax him into accepting the January date. Sistani on Wednesday reiterated his demand that the poll go ahead on schedule, his remarks a reminder that further delay could bring new political instability.

U.S. officials are no longer projecting much optimism about bringing the insurgency under control any time this year, which means that by early next year, the occupant of the White House will be facing more least-worst choices in Iraq. Strategic analysts warn it will be years before U.S. troops will be in a position to leave Iraq. There's little sign of that reality on the U.S. presidential campaign trail, of course, where optimism is the order of the day — be it from President Bush vowing that things are getting better, or John Kerry saying they're not, but that he'll magically conjure legions of allied troops to lighten the Americans' load. There may yet be some irony in the fact that so much of the U.S. presidential race was initially focused on Vietnam. That, too, was a generational war.

[jtk4]

my question is if they do not let everyone vote, and a crazy muslim guy gets elected, won't the kurds flip out. And probably start a civil war.

[sobeton]

Iraq is unstable. it would appear that Iraq in some respects is already immersed in a civil war. you have various factions fighting for power, pockets of resistance all over the country, etc. having elections in January is wishful thinking IMO.

Iraq needs to be stabilized... a clear plan of how candidates will chosen, who will oversee the elections, etc must be put forth. at present this seems inconvincible to be established by January.

[mursa]

..

.... Never trust American media 100% , they always suger coat anything thats harmful to its image ..

..

...so for even media outlets like fox news to finally admit that things are bad , in REALITY they are worse than we think .