We Got Saddam. Big Deal.

[igloo]

Originally posted by CHRles

Don't worry igloo most of us support you here whether we're Republicans or Democrats.

It's sad to see that there's a few ppl on this board who really are a threat to this country, who support dictators, and who support terrorists.

USA = A democracy

Iraq, Iran, Libya = countries ruled by dictators and extremists

Unlike Bush or Clinton, dictators don't step down from office after 4-8 years.

Further proof that Sadam's capture was a good thing:

http://news.yahoo.com/fc?tmpl=fc&cid=34&in=world&cat=libya

[djxeno]

Originally posted by cintron

1.) He built lots of hospitals.

2.) He built a massive military.

3.) He built a massive special police division to send people to those hospitals.

4.) He used the money from the oil-for-food program to build his own ass massive palaces. [over 53 palaces last i checked].

5.) He tortured, murdered and disposed of not hundreds, not thousands... HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS of dissidents, rivals and even people he just plain didnt' like, but that did him no harm.

youre gonna stand there and try to say "Yeah, but..."

fact of the matter is, he is NOT a decent guy. Dont try to make him out to be one. Hitler did GREAT things for the people he didnt send to camps or murder. I"m sure the aryan germans were real happy at all the wonderful things he was doing to coddle to their sect... but the true measure of a ruler isn't in how well he can take care of one class of people. The true measure is how well that ruler can care for ALL his people.

in case you haven't noticed, the most brutal dictators ALWAYS have followed a pattern of abusing one part of their people in order to support another.

Stalin, Mussolini, Castro, Qaddafi, Milosevic, Hitler, Saddam Hussein... take your pick. Thousands of people died under their hand in order to "Cleanse" their nations. They built hospitals too... but does that really change anything?

No it doesnt, so why do you support george bush?

[djxeno]

Originally posted by CHRles

Don't worry igloo most of us support you here whether we're Republicans or Democrats.

It's sad to see that there's a few ppl on this board who really are a threat to this country, who support dictators, and who support terrorists.

USA = A democracy

Iraq, Iran, Libya = countries ruled by dictators and extremists

Unlike Bush or Clinton, dictators don't step down from office after 4-8 years.

Further proof that Sadam's capture was a good thing:

http://news.yahoo.com/fc?tmpl=fc&cid=34&in=world&cat=libya

As far as Libya is concerned, just another Muslim country thats come under fire.

[igloo]

Originally posted by djxeno

As far as Libya is concerned, just another Muslim country thats come under fire.

Son, let this thread die. Seriously, move on. Haven't you done enough to reveal the depths of your stupidity???

The answer is yes. Let it die son, let it die.

[djxeno]

Originally posted by igloo

Son, let this thread die. Seriously, move on. Haven't you done enough to reveal the depths of your stupidity???

The answer is yes. Let it die son, let it die.

fuck you mother fucker.

[CHRles]

Originally posted by djxeno

As far as Libya is concerned, just another Muslim country thats come under fire.

:laugh: This guy is such a joke with his propaganda. Keep in mind this is the same guy that a few days ago that was trying to get your sympathy about how Palestinians are becoming extinct just like Native americans. The truth is that the Palestinians numbers have constantly grown in both Israel and Jordan tremendously. Come on Xeno tell the truth for once.

[djxeno]

Originally posted by CHRles

:laugh: This guy is such a joke with his propaganda. Keep in mind this is the same guy that a few days ago that was trying to get your sympathy about how Palestinians are becoming extinct just like Native americans. The truth is that the Palestinians numbers have constantly grown in both Israel and Jordan tremendously. Come on Xeno tell the truth for once.

so you tell me then, where did the allegations come from all of a sudden?

and why now Libya?

the truth is more Palestinians die everyday that you will ever know about.

[CHRles]

Libya has been on Americas black list for years. The thing is after 9/11 the US decided to step it up a notch against such countries.

[igloo]

Originally posted by djxeno

and why now Libya?

.

Didn't I tell you to stop reading those Hamas textbooks?

Son, I am trying to be humane. Let it die. It has actually become painful to watch you further degrade yourself.

Have some self respect and let it die.

[djxeno]

Originally posted by CHRles

Libya has been on Americas black list for years. The thing is after 9/11 the US decided to step it up a notch against such countries.

so do you think we should go after pakistan next since they have nukes and wmd's and al quelda cells and are a muslim country.

[djxeno]

Originally posted by igloo

Didn't I tell you to stop reading those Hamas textbooks?

Son, I am trying to be humane. Let it die. It has actually become painful to watch you further degrade yourself.

Have some self respect and let it die.

I'd let you die anyday.

[CHRles]

Nope, Syria is probably next, and I don't think we're done with Libya yet.

As for Pakistan, India would be only too happy to have the US attack it, but I doubt they're the next target.

[djxeno]

Originally posted by CHRles

Nope, Syria is probably next, and I don't think we're done with Libya yet.

As for Pakistan, India would be only too happy to have the US attack it, but I doubt they're the next target.

syria doesnt have shit.

[dkny8]

Originally posted by djxeno

syria doesnt have shit.

You really are clueless. If anything, Syria was more of a threat in terms of chemical and biological weapons capability than Iraq. There are mountains of articles and data chronicling Syria's attempt to acquire and develop chemical and biological weapons. This is one of just many, many researched articles that demonstrate just that:

Middle East Quarterly

Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons

by Dany Shoham

This is Part I of a two-part examination of Syria's chemical and biological weapons—how Syria built them, configures them, and (in Part II) might even use them.–The Editors

Syria today is a prominent member of the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) club, and it is not a junior member either. As early as 1992, the U.S. Defense Department ranked Syria as the sole Muslim state possessing a "chemical systems capability in all critical elements" [1] for chemical weapons. And in recent years, Syria has added biological weapons to its store—weapons with far more strategic value than chemical weapons. Budgets are also there, and in plenty. The picture of poverty that is drawn for the Syrian army's conventional ordnance is misleading. Syria spends between $1 billion and $2 billion annually on its ballistic and CB capabilities, an enormous share of the Syrian military budget.[2]

Syria's successful development of its CBW capabilities is a story that deserves to be told, for this reason: it is a textbook case of how a small but determined state can operate beneath the radar of international scrutiny, to build a formidable array of non-conventional capabilities under ostensibly scientific cover. The Syrian approach provides a striking contrast to the failed Iraqi model, and possible parallels with what Iran is attempting to achieve today in the nuclear sphere.

Yet media reports of Syria's offensive CBW capabilities have been superficial and misleading, and most discussions of Syrian CBW programs have been far from adequate.[3] What strategic concepts inform Syria's programs? Just what are the Syrians up to, in CBW production and delivery systems? And above all, what does Syrian possession of this arsenal portend for the stability and peace of the Middle East?

Syrian Strategy

The origins of Syria's strategic concept regarding non-conventional weapons lie in its joint preparations with Egypt for their October 1973 surprise attack on Israel. Thanks to transfers from Egypt, Syria for the first time acquired a chemical offensive capability. Damascus received artillery shells and aerial bombs, containing a non-persistent, lethal chemical warfare agent (sarin nerve agent) and a persistent agent (mustard blistering agent). The shells and bombs could be deployed for tactical and strategic purposes. This was the first time one Arab state supplied chemical weapons to another—in this case, in the framework of a full-fledged strategic and military alliance.[4]

It was a radical step, but even now it is impossible to say just how Syria thought it might use these weapons. By this time, both Egypt and Syria must have been certain that Israel possessed powerful non-conventional weapons. It seems likely that Syria's new chemical weapons were in constant operational readiness during the war. But they were never used, despite the fact that the war on the Syrian front was launched to recover occupied Syrian land (the Golan Heights), and its later stages were fought within artillery range of Damascus.

In any event, the war's outcome persuaded Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad that Syria had to bolster its independent military capabilities. The need to "go it alone" against Israel was confirmed by Egypt's post-war moves toward bilateral agreements and a separate peace with Israel. Asad responded with the doctrine that became known as "strategic parity." Its objective was to provide Syria with a balanced defensive and offensive capability, both strategic and military, vis-à-vis Israel.

The 1973 war had left little doubt about Israel's conventional supremacy. Moreover, Syrians understood they would not be able, in the near term, to build a technological infrastructure to support the development of nuclear weapons. Syria thus decided to explore the CBW option. When the chemical weapons Syria received from Egypt became obsolete, Syria moved independently into two main areas of self-armament: the first, aerial bombs and surface-to-surface missile warheads containing nerve agents; and the second, biological weapons.

In the early 1980s, traces of the decision could be detected in the Syrian military literature, in articles published by retired officers. But by the late 1980s, the hints and allusions were emanating from the highest echelons. In January 1987, President Asad told a Kuwaiti newspaper that Syria was seeking a technical solution that would constitute a direct counterweight to Israel's nuclear weapons. A few months later, in May 1987, Radio Damascus emphasized that Syria had an answer to the Israeli nuclear threat, possibly of even greater power. A year later, Syrian chief of staff Hikmat ash-Shihabi noted that Syria possessed deterrent weapons against Israel's extremely lethal weapons. For those who read between the lines, these statements confirmed the existence of chemical weapons in Syria, and even alluded to biological weapons either in Syria's possession or in the process of development. The statements even implied that the Syrians thought biological weapons trumped nuclear weapons.

Syrian diplomacy also arrayed itself against chemical disarmament. Foreign Minister Faruq ash-Shar‘, representing Syria at the Conference on Chemical Disarmament in Paris in 1989, told Le Monde that Syria would commit itself to the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—if Israel did. Chemical weapons, he argued, could only be eliminated in the context of a total elimination of all WMD.[5] Syria pressed other Arab states and the Arab League to endorse its rejection of the Chemical Weapons Convention (as did Egypt). In December 1992, a few weeks before the signing of the convention,Shar‘ announced that Syria would not sign, "because it will not agree to be exposed to the non-conventional threat from Israel."[6] Neither Syria nor Egypt signed, and to this day, the two states coordinate their positions, leading the Arab camp opposed to joining the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as the Biological Weapons Convention.

The Kuwait war of 1990-91 compelled Syria to take a public stance on strategic weapons in their totality, including ballistic missiles. In this somewhat different context, Syria argued that the destruction of one state's strategic weapons—in this case, Iraq's—could only be justified if linked to the destruction of the strategic weapons of all Middle Eastern states. When asked about Syria's Scud-C missiles and non-conventional capabilities, Asad declared, in a press interview, that their purpose was defensive. By such public statements, Asad conveyed his own personal strategic vision, projected a modern image for Syrian power, and imbued the Syrian armed forces with a sense of self-confidence.[7]

In 1993, Asad announced that a Syrian solution existed for regaining the Golan Heights, despite Israel's nuclear supremacy.[8] In 1995, Syria's information minister declared that Syria possessed "cards" that it had not yet played, but would play according to need in case of a military confrontation with Israel.[9] On other occasions, Asad alluded to "other types of weapons" which Syria would dispose of "only after Israel's nuclear disarmament," or to "special weapons" that could cause Israel great damage.[10]

Syria's public statements leave little room for doubt about the Syrian motive: Syria sees its CB arsenal as a counter to Israel's nuclear arsenal. Information from other sources hints more specifically at Syrian strategy. Satellite photographs of Syria's operational deployment of Scud-C missiles have revealed the integration of chemical warheads, in such a way as to furnish an option for a surprise chemical strike. The missiles are deployed such that they could be launched at Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona, and at Israel's airports and large cities—without affording Israel the option of a preemptive strike.[11] After the magazine Jane's published satellite photographs of Israel's nuclear operational system, it must be assumed that Syria has the information necessary to target this system with a chemical strike. Syrian has also moved many of the facilities for production and storage of chemical and biological weapons from aboveground to underground installations. This makes it more difficult to monitor and strike them.

On the battlefield itself—presumably, the Golan Heights—Syria also envisions CB weapons as a counter to Israeli superiority in artillery and armor. Syrian chemical weapons are apparently maintained or exercised adjacent to the Golan.[12] And despite the supremacy of the Israeli air force, the Syrian air force is also part of the strategy, through its deployment of chemical-tipped aerial bombs.

It is no exaggeration to say that the main thrust of Syrian strategy today is the reinforcement of its ballistic-chemical-biological nexus, with the goal of maximizing its power and preparedness, while minimizing its transparency and vulnerability.

Syrian "Los Alamos"

To build its capability, Syria mounted a sustained, covert effort over several decades. It all began with ‘Abdullah Watiq Shahid, a senior Syrian nuclear physicist, who was appointed minister of higher education in Syria in 1967. Shahid envisioned mobilizing Syria's meager technological and scientific resources for the national goal of weapons development. In 1971, in implementation of a presidential directive of 1969, an instrument for this activity was established:the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), an ostensibly civilian agency. Shahid was appointed director-general.

In 1973, Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad issued a new directive, officially authorizing relations between the SSRC and the Syrian army. The SSRC, which had its own link to the president's office, immediately became the principal engine for the local development and refinement of weapons for the Syrian army. In 1974, Shahid was appointed chairman of the Committee for Scientific Manpower, apparently to make it easier for him to channel manpower and financial resources to the SSRC. He simultaneously controlled the Supreme Syrian Committee for Science.

When Shahid and Asad concluded that Syria could not develop nuclear weapons, Shahid began to explore the CBW option. Syria was the second Arab state (after Egypt, and in parallel with Iraq) to commit itself to the development of CBW. Its main instrument would be the SSRC, which promoted itself internationally as a civilian science agency.

For example, the SSRC had departments of chemistry and biology under one roof, together with various armament departments—itself an unusual combination. So a pretense was manufactured: these departments were working on chemical and bacteriological pollution of rivers, sewage treatment, and the building of water purification facilities. In 1978, the SSRC sponsored the creation of an open scientific body called the Arab School for Science and Technology (ASST). This provided additional cover.

Concealment of the military mission of the SSRC was crucial to its operation, especially for its prospects of winning international funding. In the summer of 1979, when Shahid led a Syrian delegation to a U.N. scientific conference in Vienna, he described the SSRC in elliptical language, as "designed along the lines of other national institutions, and devoted to research that is specifically aimed at serving various aspects of development.The center is autonomous, and most of its researchers work full-time. Some serve in faculties of state universities."[13] In an interview, Shahid stated that "the Center concentrates its attention on a number of critical technical problems of interest to Syria in the fields of: applied and industrial chemistry, applied physics, electronics, mechanical engineering, applications of computer science and science policy."[14]

Despite this recitation of non-military concerns, the SSRC did not win international funding. Shahid expressed his frustration over this failure in an interview with the scientific journal Nature. There he complained about what he called the prevailing biases and injustice in the world scientific and technological order. Why did the lion's share of budgetary allocations go to the more advanced of the developing countries, such as Yugoslavia and Brazil? It was precisely less advanced states like Syria, he argued, that most needed this funding. [15]

Eventually, the SSRC did secure some financial support from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the purchase of equipment. And it received financial backing from the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR), for organizing professional symposia, held formally under the auspices of the Arab School for Science and Technology. Leading foreign scientists, mainly from the West, took part in the symposia; the SSRC was the main beneficiary. The Arab League extended official sponsorship to the conferences held in Syria. The Kuwaiti connection provided invaluable financial resources, allowing the SSRC to dispatch dozens of scientists abroad, where they acquired vital technological information and equipment.

Of course, people in the know, knew the truth. In 1982, Ziauddin Sardar published his book, Science and Technology in the Middle East, and did not hesitate to characterize the SSRC as a body that "belongs to the Syrian defense ministry, and conducts military research."[16] Nor did Asad's directives leave much room for doubt. Asad published another one on October 4, 1983, which raised the standing of the SSRC. All departments were upgraded to the status of research institutes, and the director-general was accorded the rank of a minister. Most importantly, however, the directive stipulated that the chief of staff would appoint members of the board of the SSRC, as well as its technical staff. (The president would continue to appoint the SSRC director-general.) The military would also authorize all appointments in the SSRC's new branch for applied sciences, the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology (HIAST).[17] It is this institute that has trained professional personnel in chemical, ballistic, and other fields.

Behind the scenes, the independent production of chemical munitions became one of the core projects of the SSRC. It was the SSRC that set up the first facility for the industrial production of chemical weapons: the "Borosilicate Glass Project," outfitted by the West German glass company Schott. The components of the facility included chemical-reaction vessels and pipes, all of them chlorine-resistant. The project produced di-chloro, a substance that is the main source of the nerve gas sarin.

Press reports have placed production sites for sarin nerve agent, VX nerve agent, and mustard gas in plants near Damascus, Hama, Homs, Aleppo, and Lattakia—all around the country. Some or all of these facilities were founded ostensibly as civilian extensions of the SSRC. Syria can also tap the production capability of over a dozen government-controlled pharmaceutical plants, likewise spread across the country.

The SSRC also promoted the establishment of various plants for the acquisition of dual-use chemicals, a modus operandi now familiar from revelations about Iraq. For example, a Damascus company named Setma imported ninety tons of trimethyl phosphate from an Indian company, supposedly for the production of the organophosphate insecticide DDVP. The compound is a precursor of nerve agents. Another Syrian company, GAS group, made similar acquisitions. But the SSRC itself remained the major "civilian" buyer, taking advantage of its ramified connections with chemical firms around the world.[18]

Late in the day, in 1992, the German government warned German research institutes not to maintain contacts with the SSRC, on the grounds that it belonged to the Syrian defense ministry, and that it simultaneously conducted military and civilian activities, including the production of chemical and biological weapons.[19] Up to that point the SSRC had operated for years without arousing any untoward questions. But by this time, it had served its purpose well. In the heyday of "innocent" international scientific cooperation—before the specter of proliferation loomed large—the SSRC had siphoned off an impressive amount of knowledge and material from the scientific cornucopia of the developed world.

Who Helped Them?

As we shall see, Syria's achievements in CBW development and production are impressive. Yet they stand in striking contrast to the very low level of Syria's technical and scientific infrastructure. How did they close the gap?

First and foremost, they achieved an optimal integration of their covert objective and their overt program. Unlike their Iraqi neighbors, the Syrians stayed sober, followed a pragmatic program, adhered to their objective, admitted their own limitations, and carefully distinguished between limitations they could change and those they could not. When they ran up against the latter, they sought help from their friends.

Second, friends did help. Syria found plenty of willing suppliers of technology, who may or may not have been aware of the end uses of the transfers, and whose governments may or may not have known Syria's real objectives.

Third, Syria proved resourceful in identifying a wide variety of suppliers, and in shifting gradually and with perfect timing, from European to Asian suppliers.

The friends were many. Egypt's transfer of chemical munitions (which also included small quantities of chemical warfare agents for research purposes) was a onetime affair. But in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, Syria made important strides thanks to knowledge obtained from the Soviet Union (and later, Russia), West Germany, France, and Iran.

The link with the Soviet army developed from its patronage of the Syrian army. The Soviet contribution to the Syrian chemical enterprise is not completely clear, but it seems to have included institutional transfer of information (in part, by the Soviet Chemical Corps), turning a blind eye to information collection by Syrian scientists and chemists-in-training who came to the Soviet Union, and the provision of sample components of munitions.[20]

When the Syrians first developed an aerial bomb containing binary sarin nerve gas, they made use of the Soviet aerial incendiary bomb ZAB for the weaponization of DF and isopropyl alcohol. From these, sarin is obtained in a binary system.At a later stage, the Syrians also explored the possibility of developing chemical warheads for the Soviet aerial cluster bomb PTAB-500 (which contains bomblets) and for the short-range Soviet missiles in Syrian possession, the FROG-7 and SS-21. By the time the commander of the Soviet Chemical Corps visited Syria in 1988, it was widely assumed that the Soviet Union had provided its Syrian clients with the capacity to arm Scud missile warheads with the persistent nerve agent VX.[21]

The connection has continued between Syria and post-Soviet Russia. In 1993, Syria acquired at least 800 kilograms of raw material for production of an updated version of VX, through a straw company established by the retired general Anatoly Kuntsevich, at that time Russian president Boris Yeltsin's adviser on chemical disarmament and commander of the Russian Military Academy for Chemical Warfare. The material was smuggled from the academy, apparently together with technological knowledge about its use. (Kuntsevich was later sacked.) Russian suppliers are believed to have provided additional raw materials via Cyprus, and to have facilitated Syria's production of advanced VX and its development of improved cluster chemical warheads.[22]

But it is in delivery systems that the Russian role is most pronounced. For a host of reasons, both economic and political, Russian arms manufacturers have been actively marketing upgraded weapons systems to Syria.[23] The Syrian air force is aging and deteriorating, due to lack of maintenance and spare parts. Syria sees its missile arsenal as compensation. Some of these systems are particularly suited to WMD, especially a new optically-guided Scud missile that might be capable of penetrating U.S.- and Israeli-made missile defense systems. According to the Russian sources, the upgraded Scud is much more accurate than its predecessors, with a miss distance not exceeding 10 to 20 meters. Accuracy is crucial to delivering the extremely persistent nerve agent VX.

West German companies also did their share. The first Syrian project involved setting up a production line for serial manufacturing of di-fluoro—DF, from which sarin nerve gas for binary munitions is obtained. The process involves two stages. The first requires resistance to a compound that includes chlorine, which has to be produced before the DF; and the second requires resistance to fluoride, an even more destructive component than chlorine. The processes require highly resistant industrial glass components. Syria chose two German companies to provide them: Schott and Sigri.[24]

Schott is one of the largest industrial glass manufacturers in Germany.The company's commercial name, Boresist, highlights its specialization in installations for the production of chemicals, made from glass of high durability in which boric oxide is a supplement to silicon oxide. It was this that led the SSRC to camouflage the entire operation under the name "Borosilicate Glass Project," whose components—chlorine-resistant chemical-reaction vessels and pipes—were supplied by Schott. Thus began the production of chemical weapons in Syria. A few years later—after many tons of the chlorine compound di-chloro (and from it, DF) had been manufactured—a spokesman of the Schott Glasswerke, answered critics. He explained that the company had no idea of the real purpose the Syrians had intended for the equipment Schott sold them. In competitive industries, he claimed, it was quite common for customers not to tell suppliers the reasons for their purchases.[25]

The German company Sigri demonstrated the same reluctance to ask questions. Sigri specialized in internal Teflon coatings for reaction vessels and for other instruments in the chemical industry that are made of stainless steel. The Teflon, in its optimal configuration, is fluoride-resistant, and the accumulated experience of the Sigri company had taught its engineers how to weld Teflon surfaces at various thicknesses, for every requirement. It too provided essential equipment for the Syrian production line.[26] The German companies Weber, Leifeld, Carl Schenck, Ferrostaal, and others also supplied the SSRC with mixing vessels, high-temperature furnaces, hot isostatic presses, and sophisticated mechanical instruments.[27]

The raw materials for DF production were purchased from various west European companies; conspicuous among them was, again, a German company, Gerit-van-Delden. The technologies, equipment, and raw materials for production of chemical and biological weapons were supplied to Syria mainly by large chemical middleman and brokerage offices, located in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, Britain, and Austria. Syria—together with Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and some further 50 countries—is still named by Britain as an importer of chemicals included in the "Australia Group" list of chemicals used in weapons production.[28]

In their development of munitions that contained sarin, the Syrians were aided by classified information obtained by a Syrian-born German, Rif‘at Ramahi, who spied for Syria while working for a company that specialized in the clean-up of chemical munitions sites. In 1992-94, Syrian military intelligence ran another German agent, one Hans-Joachim Rose, who provided industrial secrets. A German court later charged him with industrial espionage.[29]

French scientific institutes also played a role, through their relations with the SSRC. The tradition of Franco-Syrian relations extended to science, with the SSRC—in French, the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS)—presenting itself as the equivalent of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). The Syrians took away from their French scientific exchanges a storehouse of knowledge applicable to the biological field.[30]

In the 1980s, a pattern developed, whereby the same west European companies were contracted to carry out Syrian and Iranian projects, suggesting that the close relations that developed in these years between Syria and Iran included consultations on CBW. For example, Karl Kolb, a West German firm, worked on questionable projects in Iran, after it had done similar work in Syria (and Iraq). Uhde, another West German firm, assisted in the establishment of a suspicious plant for medicines in Syria, after it had established a suspicious plant for insecticides in Iran. The British company MW Kellogg simultaneously set up identical plants (for ammonia and for urea) in Syria and in Iran.[31] These plants produced classic dual-use products, with civilian and chemical weapons potential. As the Syrian-Iranian relationship deepened both strategically, technologically, and in military terms, it would have been naïve to assume that CBW technologies and material did not pass freely between them.

Everyone's Fault—And No One's

Syria now possesses the most formidable CBW capabilities of any Arab state. Its arsenal probably even exceeds that of Iran in quantity and quality. Yet in building it from scratch, under the rule of Hafiz al-Asad, Syria has always managed to stay just outside the spotlight of international scrutiny. It did so by diffusing its efforts, and by playing its political cards with supreme skill—entering (and exiting) the Arab-Israeli "peace process" at just the right times, joining the Kuwait war coalition, cutting back at the last moment on its support for Kurdish separatism in Turkey, and so on. The West has always had some reason not to include Syria on its blackest list. Other regional problems have also drawn attention away from Syria. The United States is still preoccupied with Iraq and Iran, alongside which Syria appears benign.

But at this moment in time, it is a fact: Syria has more destructive capabilities than either of them. The West is often accused of a double standard—of tolerating Israel's possession of WMD, while preventing those same weapons from coming into the hands of Arabs or Muslims. But if there is such a double standard, then how does one explain the West's silence, if not complicity, in the building of Syria's CBW capabilities? A simple explanation would be to say that Syria outwitted the world. But that explanation may be too simple. Many parties profited from the Syrian build-up, and foreign strategists thought that a strong Syrian deterrent might give Hafiz al-Asad the confidence to make peace.

He never did, however, and now that he is gone, war seems as likely as peace. What are the possible scenarios? Part II of this article will assess Syria's present CBW capabilities, look at Syria's delivery options, and ask what it all means for the stability of the Middle East.

Part II will appear in the Fall Middle East Quarterly.

Dany Shoham is a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. He holds his doctorate in medical microbiology.

[1] The Military Critical Technologies List, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Oct. 1992, p. 13-2.

[2] Shawn Pine, "Preparing for Peace? Syrian Defense Expenditures and Its Drive for Regional Hegemony," Policy Paper no. 98, Ariel Center for Policy Research, at http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp098-xs.html.

[3] M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1997, pp. 104-111.

[4] Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1998, pp. 48-58.

[5] Le Monde, Jan. 6, 1989.

[6] Al-Hayat (London), Dec. 18, 1992.

[7] Theodore Hotchkiss Clark, "Proliferation of Surface-to-Surface Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Emerging Role of Tactical Missile Defense in Israel, Syria and Iran" (Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 1993), pp. 134-97.

[8] Tishrin (Damascus), Feb. 25, 1993.

[9] Al-Qabas (Kuwait), Oct. 27, 1995.

[10] Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), May 2, 1997.

[11] The Foreign Report (London), May 12, 1998.

[12] Hatzofe (Tel Aviv), Aug. 7, 1997.

[13] Report on the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, Vienna, Austria, August 1979 (New York: United Nations, 1979), A/CONF.81/INF.8.

[14] Antoine B. Zahlan, Science and Science Policy in the Arab World (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 66.

[15] Ziauddin Sardar, "Syrians Blast U.N. CSTD over Power Politics," Nature, Oct. 1979, p. 517.

[16] Ziauddin Sardar, Science and Technology in the Middle East (London: Longman Group Limited, 1982), p. 76.

[17] For the history of HIAST, see Majd Alwan and Nour Eddine Cheikh Obeid, "Collaboration between Educational and Research Institutes and Industry in Developing Countries: Experience of Syria and HIAST," at http://nmit.georgetown.edu/papers/alwanobeid.htm.

[18] Mednews, Sept. 28, 1992

[19] Al-Usbu‘ al-‘Arabi, Nov. 30, 1992.

[20] Yosi Melman (Ha'aretz reporter), personal communication, Dec. 1996.

[21] J. H. Jackson, "When Terrorists Turn to Chemical Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review—International, Nov. 1992, p. 520.

[22] The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 30, 1996; Ha'aretz, Apr. 29, 1997; The Foreign Report (London), May 12, 1998; The Times (London), Jan. 24, 1999.

[23] Ziad K. Abdelnour, "Russia Marketing New Scud in Damascus," The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Apr. 2001, at http://www.meib.org/articles/0104_s2.htm.

[24] Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction—The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, Aug. 1992), pp. 58-79; Middle East Defense News, Oct. 24, 1988; The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 16, 1988; "The Proliferation of Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," memorandum by the Israeli embassy in Brussels, Mar. 11, 1990.

[25] The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 16, 1988.

[26] "The Proliferation of Chemical Weapons in the Middle East."

[27] Mednews, Sept. 28, 1992.

[28] The Third Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls for 1999 (London: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July 2000), at http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?3991.

[29] Reuters, Sept. 16, 1998.

[30] Mednews, Sept. 28, 1992

[31] Middle East Economy Digest, Feb. 21, 1992.

[dkny8]

And Part II:

Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent

by Dany Shoham

This is Part II of a two-part examination of Syria's chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Part I, which appeared in the Summer Middle East Quarterly, revealed how Syria built its capabilities. Part II catalogues Syria's present CBW stocks, investigates how Damascus has weaponized them, and ponders possible scenarios for their use.

Syria today has the most formidable chemical and biological weapons capabilities of any Arab state. How did Damascus achieve this? As we saw in Part I, Syria's chemical "Los Alamos" was abetted by Western suppliers, ever eager to provide chemicals, factories, and technology, and also by Western governments, conveniently content to look the other way.

Iraq under Saddam Husayn had the same ambition, but Hafiz al-Asad proceeded with greater caution. The Syrian military built the infrastructure under ostensibly scientific auspices, abjuring grand innovations and sticking to tried and tested technologies that the Syrians knew they could implement without much direct foreign guidance. And because Asad joined the international coalition against Iraq, and then entered a "peace process" with Israel, Syria's progress was never scrutinized like that of Iraq and Iran.

But capabilities are one thing; an actual CBW strategic option is another. A CBW deterrent requires a highly integrated combination of materials and delivery systems. And for this option to be truly strategic, Syria needs to be able to threaten its adversaries with CBW not just on the battlefield but on the home front—an option achievable, first and foremost, by the use of ballistic missiles. Has Syria achieved the necessary degree of integration to threaten and deter potential adversaries—above all, Syria's only declared enemy, Israel?

Missiles at the Ready

The conflict with Israel makes it incumbent on Syria to foster and maintain a high level of operational preparedness, both to deter Israel and, if necessary, to launch effective strikes against it. (While Syria must also take into account two problematic neighbors, Turkey and Iraq, they take a back seat to Syria's strategic preoccupation with Israel.) Ballistic missiles are the backbone of the Syrian posture, so that missiles effectively shape Syrian strategic orientation and operational preparedness as a whole. Missiles, of course, can be equipped with a variety of warheads. But before examining these, just what are the delivery systems at Syria's command?

The Syrian missile command is based in Aleppo. It is known to control three mobile surface-to-surface missile brigades, each of which includes one battalion of (antiquated) FROG-7 SSM, one battalion of SS-21 Scarab SRBM, and one battalion of Scud-B missiles.[1] The missiles in mobile brigades have ranges of 70 to 300 kilometers. Some sixty TEL (Transporter-Elevator-Launcher) vehicles provide mobility.

In addition to mobile brigades, Syria has recently constructed hardened silos and a deep network of tunnels. At least fifteen such underground installations, built with North Korean and Chinese assistance, are being readied for some 1,000 Scud-C missiles, which have a range of 500 kilometers.

An additional four tunnels have been built to house Scud-D missiles, which have the longest range in the Syrian arsenal, 700 kilometers. The Syrians now manufacture these missiles themselves, with North Korean, Chinese, and Iranian help. In May 2000, Syria was reported to have received deliveries from North Korea of a new ballistic missile based on the Scud-D, which has a modern navigational system, making it much more accurate than its predecessor.[2]

Syria's acquisition of Scud-D missiles is significant because they allow Damascus to strike targets throughout Israel from launchers positioned well inside Syrian territory, and thus, less easily detected or attacked by Israel. The tunnels will provide a considerable degree of defense against conventional bombing for both the missile storage and maintenance facilities, and they are linked to a large number of camouflaged launch facilities.[3] All types of Scud missiles are designed to carry, along with conventional warheads, chemical and biological warheads.

Syria has two large underground missile production facilities near Aleppo and Hama, both built with Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese assistance. Iran and Syria jointly produce Scud-C and Scud-D missiles. Syria is believed to be attempting to acquire Chinese medium-range ballistic missile technology in the form of the M-9 and may indeed have already acquired M-11 missile systems.[4]

Most of the warheads fitted to these missiles contain conventional explosives for strikes against Israeli defensive positions and reinforcements in the Golan, or they are tipped with cluster bombs designed to put airfield runways out of commission. A number of the longer-range Scuds are apparently aimed at Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona and its Jericho ballistic missile launch sites at the Sdot Micha airbase.[5] Airfields in general, plus other key military installations and major cities, are probable candidates for targeting as well. The Syrians believe that a massive and sustained missile assault against Israel's airfields could go some way to nullifying Israel's air supremacy by the destruction of aircraft, runways, and airfield infrastructure.

At the same time, nearly all of the missiles in the Syrian inventory, covering every range and payload, can be fitted with chemical or biological weapons. Just what has Syria accomplished in its efforts to built a non-conventional, missile-based deterrent?

A Chemical Present

In the early years, even before Syria had missiles, it built delivery systems for chemical weapons. Since the mid-1980s, Syria has manufactured varieties of aerial bombs containing sarin. According to Russian intelligence, Syria has a stock of thousands of chemical aerial bombs that are carried by Su-22, Su-24, and MiG-23 planes.[6] Syria also has several thousand tactical munitions, including rockets and artillery shells containing sarin.[7]

The rockets and shells have tactical value, as do the aerial bombs (which also have some strategic value). But the major leap forward towards creation of a strategic deterrent took place only when Syria began to amass chemical warheads for Scud missiles. Syria's adversaries were not capable then—and may not be capable now—of intercepting such missiles. To add to the deterrent power of the missiles, Syria moved to acquire the nerve gas VX, with the intention of deploying it in missile-borne warheads.

In contrast to sarin, VX has a high persistence and is much more lethal when encountered through the respiratory system and the skin. Since 1988, there has been a flood of reports confirming Syrian production of VX in plants located near Hama, Homs, and elsewhere. In 1998, U.S. Central Intelligence (CIA) affirmed that Syria had completed the development of more potent, more toxic, and more persistent nerve agents,[8] referring, in fact, to VX.

Almost as soon as Syria had VX, Syria sought to load it in Scud warheads. The head of the Scud-B missile underwent experimental adaptations for carrying the large nozzles and dispersal mechanisms that are needed for chemical warfare agents, especially for spraying a persistent agent such as VX. Syria also began to explore the possibility of installing VX in short-range Soviet missiles already in Syria's possession—the FROG-7 and SS-21.

Syria is believed to have excluded all Westerners from its Scud VX weaponization project. Hence the importance of the first public reference by the Russian foreign intelligence service to Syria's offensive chemical capability, published in 1993. According to the Russians, Syria possesses between 100 and 200 chemical Scud-B warheads. Moreover, Syria has also armed some sixty Scud-C missiles with chemical warheads. And with the assistance of Russian specialists, Syria has developed a cluster warhead capable of delivering chemical or biological bomblets for the Scud-D.[9]

At least one test firing of a Scud-C missile tipped with VX was conducted near Damascus in May 1998.[10] Syria also conducted successful field tests of two indigenously manufactured Scud-D missiles armed with advanced conventional and non-conventional warheads in September 2000. In July 2001, a Scud-B missile carrying a chemical warhead was launched in a test flight from near Aleppo to a point just short of the Israeli border. Reportedly, Syrian sources confirmed the flight, explaining that this was "a message to Israel not to launch any attack on Damascus."[11] Israel has received the message: the head of the Israeli intelligence agency, the Mossad, told a June 2002 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization council that Syria had adapted sarin and VX to various Scud warheads (as well as to aerial bombs and rockets).[12]

Syria's main objective according to all assessments is the completion of an arsenal of enhanced-range surface-to-surface missiles tipped with chemical and biological warheads. At present, the focus is on the installation of chemical warheads on the Scud-C, the Scud-D, and the anticipated M-9. Beyond that, the next stage might include cruise missiles that carry warheads with chemical or biological cluster munitions. (Syria apparently possesses SS-N-3b cruise missiles.)

A Biological Future?

At present, Syria's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) deterrent relies entirely on chemical weapons, which are immediately operational. But Syria is well aware that an optimal strategic deterrent should include biological warheads on long-range surface-to-surface missiles. Broadly speaking, biological weapons are considered significantly superior to chemical weapons and in some senses comparable to nuclear weapons. Syria is acting accordingly.

From bits and pieces of evidence, the following picture emerges. The Syrian biotechnological infrastructure is basically inferior, but as with chemicals, the Syrians have succeeded in creating a narrow bridgehead that enables them to progress from stage to stage. And as with chemicals, the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Damascus has taken the scientific lead through its biological department. An appreciable portion of the Syrian knowledge in the biological field was obtained by means of the Arab Science Week conferences, which the SSRC regularly organizes. The center's published studies point to work with germs and proteins,[13] while the center's scientists have trained in France in the fields of toxinology and virology. The SSRC and the Syrian Center for Marine Research in Lattakia also cooperate,[14] most probably in the investigation of lethal toxins that are derived from marine animals and plants.

Syrian attention has focused primarily on two bacterial agents, anthrax and cholera, as well as two toxins, botulinum and ricin. Anthrax is an easily grown, deadly germ with maximal stability under extreme conditions (during storage, delivery, and in the field). Cholera is a contagious bacterium, suitable for contaminating food and water supplies, producing violent alimentary epidemics. Botulinum is an extremely toxic protein (derived from a germ) whose toxic power exceeds that of any other substance, natural or synthetic. Ricin is a lethal protein (derived from beans of the castor-oil plant, easily grown in Syria) that offers an optimal relation between cost and toxicity.

In regard to anthrax, Syria has some ongoing experience in the industrial cultivation of germs and viruses for the civilian production of anthrax (and smallpox) vaccines.[15] And while evidence is sketchy, Russian experts hired by Syria are reportedly engaged in cultivating a highly virulent anthrax germ for installation in missile warheads.[16] While Syria has concentrated on anthrax and cholera germs, it has also done work on the brucella germ, establishing a biohazard facility for this pathogen as well as isolating it from sheep.[17] Pasteurella, another bacterial pathogen related to the causative agent of bubonic plague, has also been investigated in Syria. The smallpox virus, which is considered a very reliable and effective biological weapon, last visited Syria in 1972.[18] It is assumed that with its development and production as a biological weapon by Russia, it was secretly delivered to Syria.[19]

It is believed that production facilities for chemical weapons, in the Aleppo area and at other sites, also include wings for biological weapons. An additional facility for biological weapons has been reported in the village of Cerin, alongside facilities for the development and production of medicinal preparations.[20]

Syria has also shown great interest in dispersal methods. At the SSRC, a high-capacity sampler for aerosol particles was developed that was used in fieldwork that dealt with the analysis of micronic particles.[21] Such samplers are extremely useful in field-testing biological weapons. Knowledge with operational value on dispersal techniques was also acquired in the framework of research on the packing, release, and effects of weed-controlling material in a polymer format. This technique, called micro-encapsulation packing (in tiny capsules), enables the controlled and ongoing dispersal of biological (and chemical) warfare agents under unfavorable environmental conditions. Scientists from Aleppo University and Germany worked on the project.[22]

Syria would claim that all its biological research is for peaceful purposes. Syria's official position on biological weapons is that it "supports very close international cooperation in the field of biological activities for peaceful purposes, which is certain to strengthen the influence and the realism of the Biological Weapons Convention."[23] In fact, Syria has had rudimentary biological weapons in its possession since the early 1990s. Syria—together with Iran, Iraq, Libya, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Russia—is currently considered to be a biological weapons possessor or developer by the United States.[24]

The Syrian military is also beginning to plan the eventual integration of biological weapons in its tactical and strategic arsenals. In April 2000, Syrian defense minister General Mustafa Talas published a lengthy article entitled "Biological (Germ) Warfare: A New and Effective Method in Modern Warfare." (Interestingly, the article was published in Persian translation in Tehran, the key Muslim strategic ally of Damascus.)[25] All indications suggest that Syria's ultimate objective is to mount biological warheads on all varieties of the long-range surface-to-surface missiles in its possession. This is a goal that can probably be achieved within a few years, and it may already have been realized in part.

Ugly Scenarios

No Syrian spokespersons provide public information about Syrian strategic planning for CBW. At present, analysts regard the likelihood of chemical warfare between Syria and Israel to be low or medium. Syria possesses CBW capabilities, but its Israeli adversary is reckoned to have the ability to retaliate in kind and has additional means to strike Syria's battlefield forces, permanent facilities, and civilian population centers. The Syrians would also have to bear in mind the political and military consequences of a decision to use CBW. Syria's weapons are conceived as a deterrent; apparently, they were built in the hope they would not have to be used.

But the Middle East is an unpredictable place, where unlikely scenarios unfold all the time. What follows is a controlled speculation as to how Syria might actually use its CBW, in a scenario of sharply heightened conflict in the Middle East, and particularly against Israel.

• First strike. A first strike, launched at a country as small and densely inhabited as Israel, could be crippling. The implementation of chemical weapons against Israel, especially in a first strike, would be designed to impair Israel's fundamental military superiority by striking its retaliatory capabilities, especially airfields and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) command and control installations. Other likely targets would be mobilization centers, equipment warehouses, and transportation intersections. In the early stages of the war, the mission would be to prevent the arrival of reserve forces at the northern front and exert pressure on Israeli forces at the front. Were Syrians to cross the chemical Rubicon, they might also strike at population centers and industrial areas.

According to satellite imagery, the operational alignment of Syria's Scud-C missiles is such that Syria is positioned to launch a surprise chemical attack. The missiles in those photographs were aimed at the nuclear reactor in Dimona and at Israel's airports and large cities.[26] For Syria, a first strike is a first-rate strategic option—depending on its objectives and provided Syria is prepared to absorb the counterblow.[27] Syrian ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads could neutralize a substantial number of Israel's military installations and tie up its major population and industrial centers around Tel Aviv and Haifa. The effect would be even greater if the missiles were implemented in a first strike, and even more so in a surprise attack.[28]

• Golan grab. A more limited version of this scenario postulates a Syrian attack limited to northern Israel in an attempt to conquer the Golan Heights. Syria would deploy long-range launch systems and long-lasting chemical warfare agents in order to neutralize military targets (air force bases, command and control centers, radar stations, reserve mobilization and assembly areas, and equipment warehouses). Short-range launch systems would implement volatile chemical warfare agents at the front in order to ease the rapid penetration of Syrian ground forces. The idea would be to enable Syria to achieve its goal of seizing the Golan Heights before the IDF could complete the mobilization of its reserves, presenting the international community with a fait accompli.

• On the brink of defeat. Were Syria on the verge of conventional defeat, it might also resort to chemical weapons in order to avoid disaster. This option was non-existent in the previous wars between Arab states and Israel. The Syrians would justify the use of chemical weapons by claiming that their very survival was at stake. If Syria were on the brink of military defeat, any use of chemical weapons would almost certainly be aimed at the source of the immediate danger: Israeli forces, other targets at the front, and air force bases. Civilian centers would be a lower priority. But also in these circumstances, a chemical attack on civilian targets cannot be ruled out, especially if it promised to accelerate superpower intervention for a ceasefire.

• Restoring deterrence. Syria's chemical weapons are meant to deter strikes against strategic targets deep in Syrian territory, especially highly sensitive targets like government installations, dams, and civilian infrastructure. Were the Syrians to conclude this deterrent were failing, they could use chemical weapons in order to restore it. An example of this scenario was given in Kuwait's Al-Qabas newspaper in a report from its Damascus bureau. There it is suggested that Syria would fire chemical-tipped missiles were Israel to make even limited bombing attacks against Damascus.[29]

One could add still more scenarios to this brief list. The point is that there is no dearth of scenarios, and that they are increasingly realistic.

New Strategic Balance?

Syria's acquisition of a CBW option has not occurred in a vacuum. It also has to be viewed in the context of Syria's own alliances. And the most important of Syria's strategic ties are not with its "brother" Arab states. For fifteen years, Syria's closest strategic and military bond has been with Iran—a large, powerful Muslim state, one that is close to acquiring nuclear weapons and that has missiles capable of reaching Israel.

Could Syria one day find itself under an Iranian nuclear umbrella? If it did—and the road to that point may not be so long—Syria's threshold for first use of CBW could be lowered. For example, in a grab for the Golan, Syria might contemplate a limited chemical exchange with Israel, on the assumption that Israel would not retaliate with a nuclear escalation. Given the futility of all past Syrian attempts to gain military superiority over Israel by means of conventional forces, the CBW option might grow legitimate in Syrian eyes. And if a nuclear Iran gave assurances to Syria, it might diminish Syrian fears and inhibitions in choosing its weapons.

But the strategic significance of Syria's CBW option is not limited to war scenarios. Even if Israel and Syria were to reengage in a peace process, Syria would have every motive for continuing its non-conventional buildup. The goal would be to strengthen Syrian proposals for a comprehensive strategic package, whereby Israel would agree to give up any non-conventional arms it might possesses, in return for a pledge by Syria to dismantle its CBW. Syria has presented the total non-conventional disarmament of Israel, in return for a reciprocal Syrian step, as an important component of the "peace process."[30] Syria thus would seek to obtain what Egypt did not even attempt to attain in its peace agreement with Israel, and what Egypt has failed to obtain by its own recent diplomacy: the nuclear disarmament of Israel.

In the meantime, Syria continues to augment its CBW. It is estimated that about half of Syria's 300 to 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles are chemically armed.[31] Biological warheads are probably around the corner. The missiles are now much more protected in their new, reinforced underground silos. Many more Scud-C and Scud-D missiles are slated for addition to the force in the near future. Syria has recently carried out tests on modified Scud missiles using solid fuel, rather than liquid fuel, which increases the range of the missiles, improves their accuracy, and shortens the time interval between launches.[32]

Moreover, Syria has already achieved one of its primary strategic goals. In Israeli eyes, Syria is an adversary that must be reckoned with and that cannot be easily fobbed off by waving Israel's own non-conventional baton. In 1999, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak explained the urgency of pursuing a peace agreement with Syria. "The Palestinians pose no military threat to Israel," he noted. But Syria "has surface-to-surface missiles that are neatly organized and can cover the whole country with nerve gas."[33] The strongest Israeli argument for pursuing an agreement with Syria—and for making concessions along the way—has become Syria's poisoned missiles. The fathers of Syria's "Los Alamos" have every reason to take pride in the ways they have enhanced Syria's power.

Dany Shoham is a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. He holds his doctorate in medical microbiology.

[1] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Aug.2001, at http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm.

[2] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), May 29, 2000.

[3] Bennett, "The Syrian Military."

[4] Ibid.

[5] Foreign Report (London), May 12, 1998; Bennet, "The Syrian Military"; Yedi'ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), Sept. 12, 1997.

[6] The Washington Times, Nov. 26, 1999; The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 26, 1999.

[7] Bennett, "The Syrian Military."

[8] Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian.html#syria.

[9] The Washington Times, Nov. 26, 1999; The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 26, 1999.

[10] "The Great Arsenal of Autocracy: Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Feb. 1999, at http://www.meib.org/issues/9902.htm#me2.

[11] Middle East Newsline, July 1 and 15, 2001.

[12] Yedi'ot Aharonot, June 28, 2002.

[13] Middle East Newsline, July 15, 2001, at http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2001/july/07_15_2.html.

[14] Marine Environmental Centers—Mediterranean (Rome: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985), p. 262.

[15] Ath-Thawra (Damascus), Sept. 12, 1982.

[16] Associated Press, Mar. 18, 1999.

[17] There is a "Brucellosis Center" in the ministry of agriculture and agrarian reform in Damascus; M. Darwesh and A. Benkirane, "Field Investigations of Brucellosis in Cattle and Small Ruminants in Syria, 1990-1996," at http://www.oie.int/eng/publicat/rt/2003/DARWESH.PDF.

[18] United Press International, Mar. 26, 1972.

[19] Wendy Orent, "Escape from Moscow," The Sciences, May-June 1998, p. 26.

[20] "Western Firms Helping Syria's WMD Programs," Middle East Newsline, Oct. 9, 2001, at http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2001/october/10_09_4.html.

[21] "Atmospheric Pollution," proceedings of the Arab School for Science and Technology, Zabadani, Syria, Aug. 1985, p. 74.

[22] M. Kamal, G. Pfister, M. Bahadir, and J.P. Lay, "Uptake of 14-C-Simetryn by Duckweed during Release from a Polymer Matrix and the Consequent Herbicidal Effects," Journal of Controlled Release, 7 (1988): 39-44. Kamal was the Syrian.

[23] Statement by the Syrian representative to the Third Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Geneva, Sept. 1991.

[24] According to John R. Bolton, the State Department's under secretary for arms control and international security, Syria "has an offensive BW program in the research and development stage, and it may be capable of producing small quantities of the agent." Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Meeting, Geneva, Nov. 19, 2001, at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/janjuly/6231.htm.

[25] Text in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., pp. 22-28, at http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/syriaWMD.pdf.

[26] Yedi'ot Aharonot, Sept. 12, 1997.

[27] Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Policy Focus, no. 9, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dec. 1988, p. 6; Shelley A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press in association with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 58.

[28] Reuven Pedazur, "Active Defense against Ballistic Missiles—How?" Ballistic Missiles—Threat and Response: The Military Balance in the Middle East, 1987-88 (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 132.

[29] Al-Qabas (Kuwait City), Sept. 15, 1988.

[30] As-Safir (Beirut), Jan. 15, 2000.

[31] Bennet, "The Syrian Military."

[32] Yedi'ot Aharonot, Dec. 27, 1999.

[33] Ha'aretz, June 18, 1999.

[djxeno]

Originally posted by dkny8

And Part II:

Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent

by Dany Shoham

This is Part II of a two-part examination of Syria's chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Part I, which appeared in the Summer Middle East Quarterly, revealed how Syria built its capabilities. Part II catalogues Syria's present CBW stocks, investigates how Damascus has weaponized them, and ponders possible scenarios for their use.

Syria today has the most formidable chemical and biological weapons capabilities of any Arab state. How did Damascus achieve this? As we saw in Part I, Syria's chemical "Los Alamos" was abetted by Western suppliers, ever eager to provide chemicals, factories, and technology, and also by Western governments, conveniently content to look the other way.

Iraq under Saddam Husayn had the same ambition, but Hafiz al-Asad proceeded with greater caution. The Syrian military built the infrastructure under ostensibly scientific auspices, abjuring grand innovations and sticking to tried and tested technologies that the Syrians knew they could implement without much direct foreign guidance. And because Asad joined the international coalition against Iraq, and then entered a "peace process" with Israel, Syria's progress was never scrutinized like that of Iraq and Iran.

But capabilities are one thing; an actual CBW strategic option is another. A CBW deterrent requires a highly integrated combination of materials and delivery systems. And for this option to be truly strategic, Syria needs to be able to threaten its adversaries with CBW not just on the battlefield but on the home front—an option achievable, first and foremost, by the use of ballistic missiles. Has Syria achieved the necessary degree of integration to threaten and deter potential adversaries—above all, Syria's only declared enemy, Israel?

Missiles at the Ready

The conflict with Israel makes it incumbent on Syria to foster and maintain a high level of operational preparedness, both to deter Israel and, if necessary, to launch effective strikes against it. (While Syria must also take into account two problematic neighbors, Turkey and Iraq, they take a back seat to Syria's strategic preoccupation with Israel.) Ballistic missiles are the backbone of the Syrian posture, so that missiles effectively shape Syrian strategic orientation and operational preparedness as a whole. Missiles, of course, can be equipped with a variety of warheads. But before examining these, just what are the delivery systems at Syria's command?

The Syrian missile command is based in Aleppo. It is known to control three mobile surface-to-surface missile brigades, each of which includes one battalion of (antiquated) FROG-7 SSM, one battalion of SS-21 Scarab SRBM, and one battalion of Scud-B missiles.[1] The missiles in mobile brigades have ranges of 70 to 300 kilometers. Some sixty TEL (Transporter-Elevator-Launcher) vehicles provide mobility.

In addition to mobile brigades, Syria has recently constructed hardened silos and a deep network of tunnels. At least fifteen such underground installations, built with North Korean and Chinese assistance, are being readied for some 1,000 Scud-C missiles, which have a range of 500 kilometers.

An additional four tunnels have been built to house Scud-D missiles, which have the longest range in the Syrian arsenal, 700 kilometers. The Syrians now manufacture these missiles themselves, with North Korean, Chinese, and Iranian help. In May 2000, Syria was reported to have received deliveries from North Korea of a new ballistic missile based on the Scud-D, which has a modern navigational system, making it much more accurate than its predecessor.[2]

Syria's acquisition of Scud-D missiles is significant because they allow Damascus to strike targets throughout Israel from launchers positioned well inside Syrian territory, and thus, less easily detected or attacked by Israel. The tunnels will provide a considerable degree of defense against conventional bombing for both the missile storage and maintenance facilities, and they are linked to a large number of camouflaged launch facilities.[3] All types of Scud missiles are designed to carry, along with conventional warheads, chemical and biological warheads.

Syria has two large underground missile production facilities near Aleppo and Hama, both built with Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese assistance. Iran and Syria jointly produce Scud-C and Scud-D missiles. Syria is believed to be attempting to acquire Chinese medium-range ballistic missile technology in the form of the M-9 and may indeed have already acquired M-11 missile systems.[4]

Most of the warheads fitted to these missiles contain conventional explosives for strikes against Israeli defensive positions and reinforcements in the Golan, or they are tipped with cluster bombs designed to put airfield runways out of commission. A number of the longer-range Scuds are apparently aimed at Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona and its Jericho ballistic missile launch sites at the Sdot Micha airbase.[5] Airfields in general, plus other key military installations and major cities, are probable candidates for targeting as well. The Syrians believe that a massive and sustained missile assault against Israel's airfields could go some way to nullifying Israel's air supremacy by the destruction of aircraft, runways, and airfield infrastructure.

At the same time, nearly all of the missiles in the Syrian inventory, covering every range and payload, can be fitted with chemical or biological weapons. Just what has Syria accomplished in its efforts to built a non-conventional, missile-based deterrent?

A Chemical Present

In the early years, even before Syria had missiles, it built delivery systems for chemical weapons. Since the mid-1980s, Syria has manufactured varieties of aerial bombs containing sarin. According to Russian intelligence, Syria has a stock of thousands of chemical aerial bombs that are carried by Su-22, Su-24, and MiG-23 planes.[6] Syria also has several thousand tactical munitions, including rockets and artillery shells containing sarin.[7]

The rockets and shells have tactical value, as do the aerial bombs (which also have some strategic value). But the major leap forward towards creation of a strategic deterrent took place only when Syria began to amass chemical warheads for Scud missiles. Syria's adversaries were not capable then—and may not be capable now—of intercepting such missiles. To add to the deterrent power of the missiles, Syria moved to acquire the nerve gas VX, with the intention of deploying it in missile-borne warheads.

In contrast to sarin, VX has a high persistence and is much more lethal when encountered through the respiratory system and the skin. Since 1988, there has been a flood of reports confirming Syrian production of VX in plants located near Hama, Homs, and elsewhere. In 1998, U.S. Central Intelligence (CIA) affirmed that Syria had completed the development of more potent, more toxic, and more persistent nerve agents,[8] referring, in fact, to VX.

Almost as soon as Syria had VX, Syria sought to load it in Scud warheads. The head of the Scud-B missile underwent experimental adaptations for carrying the large nozzles and dispersal mechanisms that are needed for chemical warfare agents, especially for spraying a persistent agent such as VX. Syria also began to explore the possibility of installing VX in short-range Soviet missiles already in Syria's possession—the FROG-7 and SS-21.

Syria is believed to have excluded all Westerners from its Scud VX weaponization project. Hence the importance of the first public reference by the Russian foreign intelligence service to Syria's offensive chemical capability, published in 1993. According to the Russians, Syria possesses between 100 and 200 chemical Scud-B warheads. Moreover, Syria has also armed some sixty Scud-C missiles with chemical warheads. And with the assistance of Russian specialists, Syria has developed a cluster warhead capable of delivering chemical or biological bomblets for the Scud-D.[9]

At least one test firing of a Scud-C missile tipped with VX was conducted near Damascus in May 1998.[10] Syria also conducted successful field tests of two indigenously manufactured Scud-D missiles armed with advanced conventional and non-conventional warheads in September 2000. In July 2001, a Scud-B missile carrying a chemical warhead was launched in a test flight from near Aleppo to a point just short of the Israeli border. Reportedly, Syrian sources confirmed the flight, explaining that this was "a message to Israel not to launch any attack on Damascus."[11] Israel has received the message: the head of the Israeli intelligence agency, the Mossad, told a June 2002 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization council that Syria had adapted sarin and VX to various Scud warheads (as well as to aerial bombs and rockets).[12]

Syria's main objective according to all assessments is the completion of an arsenal of enhanced-range surface-to-surface missiles tipped with chemical and biological warheads. At present, the focus is on the installation of chemical warheads on the Scud-C, the Scud-D, and the anticipated M-9. Beyond that, the next stage might include cruise missiles that carry warheads with chemical or biological cluster munitions. (Syria apparently possesses SS-N-3b cruise missiles.)

A Biological Future?

At present, Syria's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) deterrent relies entirely on chemical weapons, which are immediately operational. But Syria is well aware that an optimal strategic deterrent should include biological warheads on long-range surface-to-surface missiles. Broadly speaking, biological weapons are considered significantly superior to chemical weapons and in some senses comparable to nuclear weapons. Syria is acting accordingly.

From bits and pieces of evidence, the following picture emerges. The Syrian biotechnological infrastructure is basically inferior, but as with chemicals, the Syrians have succeeded in creating a narrow bridgehead that enables them to progress from stage to stage. And as with chemicals, the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Damascus has taken the scientific lead through its biological department. An appreciable portion of the Syrian knowledge in the biological field was obtained by means of the Arab Science Week conferences, which the SSRC regularly organizes. The center's published studies point to work with germs and proteins,[13] while the center's scientists have trained in France in the fields of toxinology and virology. The SSRC and the Syrian Center for Marine Research in Lattakia also cooperate,[14] most probably in the investigation of lethal toxins that are derived from marine animals and plants.

Syrian attention has focused primarily on two bacterial agents, anthrax and cholera, as well as two toxins, botulinum and ricin. Anthrax is an easily grown, deadly germ with maximal stability under extreme conditions (during storage, delivery, and in the field). Cholera is a contagious bacterium, suitable for contaminating food and water supplies, producing violent alimentary epidemics. Botulinum is an extremely toxic protein (derived from a germ) whose toxic power exceeds that of any other substance, natural or synthetic. Ricin is a lethal protein (derived from beans of the castor-oil plant, easily grown in Syria) that offers an optimal relation between cost and toxicity.

In regard to anthrax, Syria has some ongoing experience in the industrial cultivation of germs and viruses for the civilian production of anthrax (and smallpox) vaccines.[15] And while evidence is sketchy, Russian experts hired by Syria are reportedly engaged in cultivating a highly virulent anthrax germ for installation in missile warheads.[16] While Syria has concentrated on anthrax and cholera germs, it has also done work on the brucella germ, establishing a biohazard facility for this pathogen as well as isolating it from sheep.[17] Pasteurella, another bacterial pathogen related to the causative agent of bubonic plague, has also been investigated in Syria. The smallpox virus, which is considered a very reliable and effective biological weapon, last visited Syria in 1972.[18] It is assumed that with its development and production as a biological weapon by Russia, it was secretly delivered to Syria.[19]

It is believed that production facilities for chemical weapons, in the Aleppo area and at other sites, also include wings for biological weapons. An additional facility for biological weapons has been reported in the village of Cerin, alongside facilities for the development and production of medicinal preparations.[20]

Syria has also shown great interest in dispersal methods. At the SSRC, a high-capacity sampler for aerosol particles was developed that was used in fieldwork that dealt with the analysis of micronic particles.[21] Such samplers are extremely useful in field-testing biological weapons. Knowledge with operational value on dispersal techniques was also acquired in the framework of research on the packing, release, and effects of weed-controlling material in a polymer format. This technique, called micro-encapsulation packing (in tiny capsules), enables the controlled and ongoing dispersal of biological (and chemical) warfare agents under unfavorable environmental conditions. Scientists from Aleppo University and Germany worked on the project.[22]

Syria would claim that all its biological research is for peaceful purposes. Syria's official position on biological weapons is that it "supports very close international cooperation in the field of biological activities for peaceful purposes, which is certain to strengthen the influence and the realism of the Biological Weapons Convention."[23] In fact, Syria has had rudimentary biological weapons in its possession since the early 1990s. Syria—together with Iran, Iraq, Libya, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Russia—is currently considered to be a biological weapons possessor or developer by the United States.[24]

The Syrian military is also beginning to plan the eventual integration of biological weapons in its tactical and strategic arsenals. In April 2000, Syrian defense minister General Mustafa Talas published a lengthy article entitled "Biological (Germ) Warfare: A New and Effective Method in Modern Warfare." (Interestingly, the article was published in Persian translation in Tehran, the key Muslim strategic ally of Damascus.)[25] All indications suggest that Syria's ultimate objective is to mount biological warheads on all varieties of the long-range surface-to-surface missiles in its possession. This is a goal that can probably be achieved within a few years, and it may already have been realized in part.

Ugly Scenarios

No Syrian spokespersons provide public information about Syrian strategic planning for CBW. At present, analysts regard the likelihood of chemical warfare between Syria and Israel to be low or medium. Syria possesses CBW capabilities, but its Israeli adversary is reckoned to have the ability to retaliate in kind and has additional means to strike Syria's battlefield forces, permanent facilities, and civilian population centers. The Syrians would also have to bear in mind the political and military consequences of a decision to use CBW. Syria's weapons are conceived as a deterrent; apparently, they were built in the hope they would not have to be used.

But the Middle East is an unpredictable place, where unlikely scenarios unfold all the time. What follows is a controlled speculation as to how Syria might actually use its CBW, in a scenario of sharply heightened conflict in the Middle East, and particularly against Israel.

• First strike. A first strike, launched at a country as small and densely inhabited as Israel, could be crippling. The implementation of chemical weapons against Israel, especially in a first strike, would be designed to impair Israel's fundamental military superiority by striking its retaliatory capabilities, especially airfields and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) command and control installations. Other likely targets would be mobilization centers, equipment warehouses, and transportation intersections. In the early stages of the war, the mission would be to prevent the arrival of reserve forces at the northern front and exert pressure on Israeli forces at the front. Were Syrians to cross the chemical Rubicon, they might also strike at population centers and industrial areas.

According to satellite imagery, the operational alignment of Syria's Scud-C missiles is such that Syria is positioned to launch a surprise chemical attack. The missiles in those photographs were aimed at the nuclear reactor in Dimona and at Israel's airports and large cities.[26] For Syria, a first strike is a first-rate strategic option—depending on its objectives and provided Syria is prepared to absorb the counterblow.[27] Syrian ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads could neutralize a substantial number of Israel's military installations and tie up its major population and industrial centers around Tel Aviv and Haifa. The effect would be even greater if the missiles were implemented in a first strike, and even more so in a surprise attack.[28]

• Golan grab. A more limited version of this scenario postulates a Syrian attack limited to northern Israel in an attempt to conquer the Golan Heights. Syria would deploy long-range launch systems and long-lasting chemical warfare agents in order to neutralize military targets (air force bases, command and control centers, radar stations, reserve mobilization and assembly areas, and equipment warehouses). Short-range launch systems would implement volatile chemical warfare agents at the front in order to ease the rapid penetration of Syrian ground forces. The idea would be to enable Syria to achieve its goal of seizing the Golan Heights before the IDF could complete the mobilization of its reserves, presenting the international community with a fait accompli.

• On the brink of defeat. Were Syria on the verge of conventional defeat, it might also resort to chemical weapons in order to avoid disaster. This option was non-existent in the previous wars between Arab states and Israel. The Syrians would justify the use of chemical weapons by claiming that their very survival was at stake. If Syria were on the brink of military defeat, any use of chemical weapons would almost certainly be aimed at the source of the immediate danger: Israeli forces, other targets at the front, and air force bases. Civilian centers would be a lower priority. But also in these circumstances, a chemical attack on civilian targets cannot be ruled out, especially if it promised to accelerate superpower intervention for a ceasefire.

• Restoring deterrence. Syria's chemical weapons are meant to deter strikes against strategic targets deep in Syrian territory, especially highly sensitive targets like government installations, dams, and civilian infrastructure. Were the Syrians to conclude this deterrent were failing, they could use chemical weapons in order to restore it. An example of this scenario was given in Kuwait's Al-Qabas newspaper in a report from its Damascus bureau. There it is suggested that Syria would fire chemical-tipped missiles were Israel to make even limited bombing attacks against Damascus.[29]

One could add still more scenarios to this brief list. The point is that there is no dearth of scenarios, and that they are increasingly realistic.

New Strategic Balance?

Syria's acquisition of a CBW option has not occurred in a vacuum. It also has to be viewed in the context of Syria's own alliances. And the most important of Syria's strategic ties are not with its "brother" Arab states. For fifteen years, Syria's closest strategic and military bond has been with Iran—a large, powerful Muslim state, one that is close to acquiring nuclear weapons and that has missiles capable of reaching Israel.

Could Syria one day find itself under an Iranian nuclear umbrella? If it did—and the road to that point may not be so long—Syria's threshold for first use of CBW could be lowered. For example, in a grab for the Golan, Syria might contemplate a limited chemical exchange with Israel, on the assumption that Israel would not retaliate with a nuclear escalation. Given the futility of all past Syrian attempts to gain military superiority over Israel by means of conventional forces, the CBW option might grow legitimate in Syrian eyes. And if a nuclear Iran gave assurances to Syria, it might diminish Syrian fears and inhibitions in choosing its weapons.

But the strategic significance of Syria's CBW option is not limited to war scenarios. Even if Israel and Syria were to reengage in a peace process, Syria would have every motive for continuing its non-conventional buildup. The goal would be to strengthen Syrian proposals for a comprehensive strategic package, whereby Israel would agree to give up any non-conventional arms it might possesses, in return for a pledge by Syria to dismantle its CBW. Syria has presented the total non-conventional disarmament of Israel, in return for a reciprocal Syrian step, as an important component of the "peace process."[30] Syria thus would seek to obtain what Egypt did not even attempt to attain in its peace agreement with Israel, and what Egypt has failed to obtain by its own recent diplomacy: the nuclear disarmament of Israel.

In the meantime, Syria continues to augment its CBW. It is estimated that about half of Syria's 300 to 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles are chemically armed.[31] Biological warheads are probably around the corner. The missiles are now much more protected in their new, reinforced underground silos. Many more Scud-C and Scud-D missiles are slated for addition to the force in the near future. Syria has recently carried out tests on modified Scud missiles using solid fuel, rather than liquid fuel, which increases the range of the missiles, improves their accuracy, and shortens the time interval between launches.[32]

Moreover, Syria has already achieved one of its primary strategic goals. In Israeli eyes, Syria is an adversary that must be reckoned with and that cannot be easily fobbed off by waving Israel's own non-conventional baton. In 1999, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak explained the urgency of pursuing a peace agreement with Syria. "The Palestinians pose no military threat to Israel," he noted. But Syria "has surface-to-surface missiles that are neatly organized and can cover the whole country with nerve gas."[33] The strongest Israeli argument for pursuing an agreement with Syria—and for making concessions along the way—has become Syria's poisoned missiles. The fathers of Syria's "Los Alamos" have every reason to take pride in the ways they have enhanced Syria's power.

Dany Shoham is a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. He holds his doctorate in medical microbiology.

[1] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Aug.2001, at http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm.

[2] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), May 29, 2000.

[3] Bennett, "The Syrian Military."

[4] Ibid.

[5] Foreign Report (London), May 12, 1998; Bennet, "The Syrian Military"; Yedi'ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), Sept. 12, 1997.

[6] The Washington Times, Nov. 26, 1999; The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 26, 1999.

[7] Bennett, "The Syrian Military."

[8] Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian.html#syria.

[9] The Washington Times, Nov. 26, 1999; The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 26, 1999.

[10] "The Great Arsenal of Autocracy: Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Feb. 1999, at http://www.meib.org/issues/9902.htm#me2.

[11] Middle East Newsline, July 1 and 15, 2001.

[12] Yedi'ot Aharonot, June 28, 2002.

[13] Middle East Newsline, July 15, 2001, at http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2001/july/07_15_2.html.

[14] Marine Environmental Centers—Mediterranean (Rome: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985), p. 262.

[15] Ath-Thawra (Damascus), Sept. 12, 1982.

[16] Associated Press, Mar. 18, 1999.

[17] There is a "Brucellosis Center" in the ministry of agriculture and agrarian reform in Damascus; M. Darwesh and A. Benkirane, "Field Investigations of Brucellosis in Cattle and Small Ruminants in Syria, 1990-1996," at http://www.oie.int/eng/publicat/rt/2003/DARWESH.PDF.

[18] United Press International, Mar. 26, 1972.

[19] Wendy Orent, "Escape from Moscow," The Sciences, May-June 1998, p. 26.

[20] "Western Firms Helping Syria's WMD Programs," Middle East Newsline, Oct. 9, 2001, at http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2001/october/10_09_4.html.

[21] "Atmospheric Pollution," proceedings of the Arab School for Science and Technology, Zabadani, Syria, Aug. 1985, p. 74.

[22] M. Kamal, G. Pfister, M. Bahadir, and J.P. Lay, "Uptake of 14-C-Simetryn by Duckweed during Release from a Polymer Matrix and the Consequent Herbicidal Effects," Journal of Controlled Release, 7 (1988): 39-44. Kamal was the Syrian.

[23] Statement by the Syrian representative to the Third Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Geneva, Sept. 1991.

[24] According to John R. Bolton, the State Department's under secretary for arms control and international security, Syria "has an offensive BW program in the research and development stage, and it may be capable of producing small quantities of the agent." Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Meeting, Geneva, Nov. 19, 2001, at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/janjuly/6231.htm.

[25] Text in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., pp. 22-28, at http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/syriaWMD.pdf.

[26] Yedi'ot Aharonot, Sept. 12, 1997.

[27] Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Policy Focus, no. 9, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dec. 1988, p. 6; Shelley A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press in association with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 58.

[28] Reuven Pedazur, "Active Defense against Ballistic Missiles—How?" Ballistic Missiles—Threat and Response: The Military Balance in the Middle East, 1987-88 (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 132.

[29] Al-Qabas (Kuwait City), Sept. 15, 1988.

[30] As-Safir (Beirut), Jan. 15, 2000.

[31] Bennet, "The Syrian Military."

[32] Yedi'ot Aharonot, Dec. 27, 1999.

[33] Ha'aretz, June 18, 1999.

wow, really fascinating, so what do you wanna do, go after every fuckn country that has WMDs?

or just the Muslim ones?

[mr mahs]

Originally posted by djxeno

so do you think we should go after pakistan next since they have nukes and wmd's and al quelda cells and are a muslim country.

The only reason we aren't knee deep in Pakistan right now is because Masharef made a wise choice.. After 911 and also the recent events show they are a partner in the war on terror, he had an attempt on his life recently for his support he shows the "evil west"..

Let say he was reluctant to help us.. Then you would have heard the same rhetoric as Iraq received.. The key word here is COOPERATION!!!

[eccentricmofo]

Ok, this thread has gone on a one-way trip to retardville.

Two points Id like to make real quick.

1- For all the bush haters and/or disagreers. Everyone will always have disagreements with leadership, thats part of the American way, we vote (majority rather) in a certain person then we bitch about our own countries consensus. Bottom-line, is that he is our president, respect that fact... Everyone makes mistakes (by this statement Im NOT asking for a list), but he is the prez, so quit whining. Your not really making anything more then a headache.

2- As for the childish remarks. People we have to pretend to act like adults here. I do go over the edge at times but the constand "I'LL KILL YOU..." and the "I'LL KILL YOU MORE" , "DIE DIE DIE YOU COMMIE" ... as well as semi-racist remarks (meaning country of origin etc.) have to go.

Im not the moderator, and not trying to moderate, but just merely pointing out a fact. You all know no one is going to kick the other person's ass in real life (no matter how bad you may want to), its just not going to happen.

and a quick addition... DUDE DKNY, next time put a warning label on that helluva long ass post...lol. I dont have that much will power to stay focused reading it...jk..

[normalnoises]

I know what DKNY means...

Don't

Know

Nothing

Yet

Fits you perfectly DKNY.

Don't let your pantyhose cut off your blood circulation.

[xpyrate]

Originally posted by igloo

This may be the most ignorant post I have ever read.

You are actually offering a defense for Bush????

He did numerous good things for teh country??????He built hospitals??????.....For who, the people he tortured, raped, and maimed...

He modernized an army??????????For starting wars and invading countries, and building WMD that he used..

He only kiiled "hundreds of innocent people???????????Reaaly, so out of the estimated 10-20000 people buried in mass graves, only hundreds are "innocent"

Are you fucking kidding me????????? Your stance is unreal and simply mind boggling......

He was the only american leaders to stand up for us?.....Are you kidding me?...What thh fuck are you talking about?....If you thinking providing $billions to support the Israeli is standing up for the "true" american people, you are lost, seriously lost....

No indication that the american people wanted him out of power??????...DO you live under a rock?.....

The only people who wanted him out of power were the american people, and they were a minority?????...Are you kidding me?????Minority?????..How fucking clueless can you be??????

The only country that attacked other countries that surrounds its borders is Iraq???????...are you kidding me??????...Where did you pick up that world history, an Israeli textbook?

The whole WMD debate, and why Iraq doesn't have them and why Ireal should not and the bigger issue of weapons proliferation is another debate... one you are obviously ill equipped to have.

Yur post has to be the most ridiculous, inaccurate post I have ever read.....absolutely mind boggling and scary that you can be this blind.

Also, good job avoiding my response to your first absurd post. And you do so to produce this stack of shit?...

great points there iggy ... i see you're actually thinking for a change

[igloo]

Originally posted by djxeno

wow, really fascinating, so what do you wanna do, go after every fuckn country that has WMDs?

or just the Muslim ones?

Son, please...let it die.

It pains me to see you getting your ass kicked like never seen before. I actually feel bad for you.

not.

[djxeno]

Originally posted by igloo

Son, please...let it die.

It pains me to see you getting your ass kicked like never seen before. I actually feel bad for you.

not.

i let it die along time ago, u are the one still posting jerk off.

[nycmuzik]

You just cant do enough to make some people happy....Fuckin incredible....

If you love Saddam so much then maybe you should invite him over for Christmas....He's probably got a few good stories to tell....

[xpyrate]

who said anything about loving saddam?

now that he is out of power, we have our security level raised to orange. if he was that much of threat, how come it wasn't lowered? hmmm .... seems to me he wasn't much of a threat after all. the threat level was lower when sadam was in power, now that we caught him it's up to orange for the first time i can recollect. this is the exact reason i was against this war in the first place. the plain and simple reality that this war has only increased the risk of terrorism.

[igloo]

Originally posted by xpyrate

who said anything about loving saddam?

now that he is out of power, we have our security level raised to orange. if he was that much of threat, how come it wasn't lowered? hmmm .... seems to me he wasn't much of a threat after all. the threat level was lower when sadam was in power, now that we caught him it's up to orange for the first time i can recollect. this is the exact reason i was against this war in the first place. the plain and simple reality that this war has only increased the risk of terrorism.

The mind of a simpleton